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INTRODUCTION

By the time Republican Richard M. Nixon took office as the 37th President of
the United States on January 20, 1969, Chief Justice Earl Warren had already
publicly committed to retiring at the end of the court's term in June. 2 Engulfed in
scandal, Justice Abe Fortas then announced his resignation on May 15, 1969.3
Facing the prospect of two Republican appointments to the liberal Warren
Court,' Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Majority Leader of the
Democratic-controlled Senate, did not commit the Senate to a moratorium on even
entertaining nominations to the Supreme Court until a new President, perhaps a
Democrat, was elected.5 But what if Mansfield had?
If Mansfield had imposed a moratorium on Supreme Court nominations until
a Democratic President took office-eight years later, it would turn out6-the
membership of the Court would have withered. The nine-member Court of May
1969' would have dropped to seven members after Warren and Fortas departed.
Had the moratorium continued, the membership of the Court would have declined
to five Justices by September 1971, when declining health forced Justices Hugo L.
Black and, a week later, John M. Harlan9 to retire. At that point, the rump Court
of Five would have been forced to cease operations because a quorum of six is
required by law to do business.' 0 Had the moratorium continued through the
succession of Republican Gerald Ford to the Presidency following Nixon's

2 See 115 CONG. REC. 1289-90 (1969); See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., Warren Consents to Nixon
Request to Stay Till June, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1968, at 1; Anthony Lewis, Warren Firm on Retiring;
Leaves Date up to Nixon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1968, at 1; Editorial, The Warren Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1968, at 46.
' Fred P. Graham, Fortas Quits the Supreme Court, Defends Deakngs with Wolfson; Liberal
Majority May Be Curbed Fee Is Explained-Justice Concedes He Made Arrangement on a Life
Stipend, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1969, at 1; The Texts of Letters and Statements Involving the

Resignation ofJustice Fortas, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1969, at 20.
4 Robert B. Semple, Jr., FortasQuits the Supreme Court, Defends Dealings with Wolfson; Liberal
Majonty May Be Curbed: 2 Positions Open-Nixon s Choices Can Alter the Direction Taken by

Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1969, at 1.
' Fred P. Graham, A Wolfson-ForrasParleyon S.E.C. Case Reported, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1969,
at 1 ("The Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, said today that the Senate would make a searching
investigation of future Supreme Court nominees, but that Senate Democrats would not oppose
President Nixon's nominees simply on partisan grounds, if they were Republicans.").
6 See 123 CONG. REc. 1862 (1977) (documenting Jimmy Carter's inauguration).
7 Front Matter, 394 U.S. III (1969) (listing Warren, C.J., and Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan,
Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall, JJ.).
' Robert B. Semple, Jr.,JusticeBlack, 85, Quits High Court, Citing His Health, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

18, 1971, at 1.
9 James M. Naughton, HarlanRetires; Nixon Hints Poffis a Court Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1971, at 1. Like the two in 1969, these vacancies gave liberal Democrats in the Senate a strong incentive
to hold these seats open, particularly given that the next presidential election was just over a year away.
SeeFred P. Graham, Towarda Nixon Court,'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1971, at 12.

1o 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679-82 (2010)
(limiting ability of federal agencies to manipulate around a statutory quorum requirement).
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resignation," the membership of the Court would have fallen to just four Justices in
November 1975, when declining health also induced Justice William 0. Douglas
to retire. 2 As the nation celebrated the 1976 Bicentennial of its independence,
the four-member Supreme Court would have been left in an indefinite state of
suspended animation.
Only after Jimmy Carter took office as President on January 20, 1977,'" with a
filibuster-proof Democratic majority in the Senate'" might the Supreme Court
have been resuscitated by the addition of five new Democratic Justices. Instead of
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell,
7
Jr., William H. Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens,'" all Nixon or Ford appointees,1
the 1977 Court might have consisted of five new Democratic appointees, including
a new Democratic Chief Justice, alongside Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter
Stewart, Byron R. White, and Thurgood Marshall.' The Court might have had a
seven-member supermajority of liberals for the foreseeable future. Conservative
Republicans would have conceded defeat and said, "Well played!" Right?'
Of course, Mansfield did not impose a political moratorium on Supreme Court
nominations from 1969 to 1977,20 but, constitutionally speaking, he could have, or
so say defenders of the constitutionality of the shorter moratorium announced by
Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican Majority Leader, on February 13, 2016,
the day of Justice Antonin Scalia's death.2 ' Professor Noah Feldman, for example,
shrugged, "The Senate has essentially complete control over its own rules and
practices."22 When Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton appeared poised to win
'1 See, e.g., Resignation of President Nixon, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1021 (Aug. 12,
1974); Administration of Gerald R. Ford: Presidential Documents, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoCs.
1023-25 (Aug. 12, 1974).
12 Lesley Oeisner, Douglas Quits Supreme Court; Ford Hails 360-Year Service: Poor Health
Cited-Woman Successor ReportedStudie, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1975, at 1; Texts on Retirement of
JusticeDouglas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1975, at 60 (letter ofJustice William 0. Douglas).
12 See James T. Wooten, PresidentTalks: Philadelphia Throngs Told US. Is Leader-LibertyBell
Rings, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1976, at 1.
14 See 123 CONG. REC. 1862
(1977).

1s

Party

Division,

U.S.

SENATE,

https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm

[https://perma.cc/K8LN-R8KQJ (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
16 Front Matter, 429 U.S. III (1978).
17
About
the
Court: Justices
1789
to
Present,
U.S.
SUP.
CT.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/memberstext.aspx [https://perma.cc/8439-MMYC] (last visited
Feb. 8,2018).
18 FrontMatter, 429 U.S. at III.
19 Future Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell would not have been pleased at the time. See
A. Mitchell McConnell, Jr., Haynesworthand Carswell A New Senate StandardofExcellence, 59 KY.
L.J. 43 (1970-71) (criticizing the covert influence of ideological considerations in the Senate
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices).
20 See Graham, supranote 5.
21
Senator
Mitch
McConnell,
FACEBOOK
(Feb.
13,
2016),
[https://perma.cc/8XRGhttps://www.facebook.com/mitchmcconnell/posts/1021148581257166
USC9]. For the full details of this moratorium, see infra Section IV.G.
22 Noah Feldman, Opinion, Obama and Republcans Arc Both Wrong About Constitution,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 17, 2016, 12:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-

M07-2018
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the 2016 presidential election, libertarian commentator Ilya Shapiro did more than
shrug. He echoed several Republican Senators in urging McConnell and the
Republican-controlled Senate to do exactly what Mansfield did not do: refuse to
confirm any Supreme Court nominee over the ensuing four or eight years, if not
longer, until a President of their own party took office." "As a matter of
constitutional law, the Senate is fully within its powers to let the Supreme Court
die out, literally," he argued; "it's definitely constitutional."24
With all due respect to Shapiro, who made a strong argument, a preemptive
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations is not definitely constitutional. At
best, it is arguably constitutional, but it is also quite arguably unconstitutional. A
large group of law professors certainly said so in a letter organized by the liberalleaning, Alliance for Justice, at the outset of the McConnell moratorium. 25 But
neither their arguments nor those of the defenders of the moratorium's
constitutionality framed the issue dearly or properly. A Senate-imposed
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations, depending on the precise
circumstances, may well violate the Constitution because it may breach the
separation of powers. 26
Those who have defended the constitutionality of such a moratorium have not
adequately addressed the separation of powers, one of the Constitution's essential
structural features. Focusing excessively on the specific text, they have too hastily
supposed that the absence of any explcit limitation on the Senate's confirmation
prerogative means that the Senate has the discretion to exercise that prerogative in
any way it sees fit,2 7 regardless of any potential impact on the powers of the
President or the Supreme Court. But if the Constitution were interpreted with
such absolute dependence on explicit limitations, the Senate could also disregard
executive privilege in compelling testimony from presidential advisors,28 as the

17/obama-and-senate-are-both-wrong-about-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/J8D9-Y5YS]; see also
Vikram David Amar, The Grave Risks of the Senate Republcans' Stated Refusal to Process Any
Supreme Court Nominee President Obama Sends Them, VERDICT (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/02/26/the-grave-risks-of-the-senate-republicans-stated-refusal-toprocess-any-supreme-court-nominee-president-obama-sends-them [https://perma.cc/V4VY-HLYV].
' Ilya Shapiro, The Senate Should Refuse to Confirm All ofHiflary ChntonsJudicial Nominees,
FEDERALIST (Oct. 26, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/10/26/senate-refuse-confirm-hillaryclintons-judicial-nominees/ [https://perma.cc/26DT-N3WL].
24 jd
25 Letter from Law Professors of Various Institutions to Mitch McConnell and Various Members
of the Senate, https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Law-professor-SCOTUS-vacancyletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVY7Y-8JJ4] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
26 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699-702 (1997) (summarizing the doctrine); see also Loving
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756-58 (1996).
27 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
28 See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Comm. on
Oversight & GoVt Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v.
Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187
(1957) (noting that houses of Congress have an implied power to conduct investigations and subpoena

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

342

Vol. 106

Constitution nowhere explicitly mentions executive privilege or any limit on the
Senate's interrogation of presidential advisors.2 9 To be sure, the Senate has no
obligation to confirm a Supreme Court nominee, nor may it have any obligation
even to give a nominee a confirmation vote."o The Senate does, indeed, have
sweeping discretion in exercising its "Advice and Consent" function."' Still,
announcing that it will henceforth entertain no Supreme Court nominations from
the sitting President may well violate the separation of powers.
There are at least three ways in which a preemptive Senate moratorium may
violate the separation of powers. First, such a moratorium may impermissibly
intrude upon the President's exclusive power to nominate persons to serve as
Supreme Court Justices.3 2 It may intrude upon that power either by failing to give
meaningful effect to the constitutional act of making a nomination or by
attempting to exercise partial agency over the choice of nominees by "Presidentshopping" 3 for a new nominator. Second, a preemptive Senate moratorium may
unduly impair the ability of the President to fulfill his constitutional obligation to
assure the faithful execution of the laws in using his appointment power to keep the
Supreme Court staffed with the number of Justices mandated by federal law 3 4 -a
federal law the Senate has no power to amend or repeal unilaterally.3 s Third, a
preemptive Senate moratorium may unduly impair the ability of the Supreme
Court to perform its constitutional duties. The impairments may range from
burdening the practical management of its caseload to diminishing the primary
source of its authority- its legitimacy as an impartial, non-partisan arbiter of the
law. The Senate may not have to do much in response to a Supreme Court
nomination, but it may have to do more than pretend that the nomination does not
exist, particularly for months or years on end and particularly as vacancies mount.3 6
This Article has four major parts. Part I describes the constitutional standards
applicable to separation of powers questions and rejects two general arguments
witnesses as incidental to the power to legislate); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-61, 173-74

(1927).
29 Mark Rozell, The Constitution and Executive Privilege, LAW
& LIBERTY (July 12, 2012),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012/07/12/the-constitution-and-executive-privilege/

[https://perma.cc/USQ9-SPWU].
30

Jonathan

H. Adler, The Senate Has No Constitutional Obbgation to Consider Nominees, 24

GEO. MASON L. REv. 15, 17-18 (2016).
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may
.

determine the Rules of its Proceedings . .
32 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

" J. Stephen Clark, President-Shopping for a New Scala: The Illegitimacy of "McConnell
Majorities"inSupreme CourtDecision-Making, 80 ALB. L. REV. 743, 744 (2016-2017).
34 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3.
3s See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-59 (1983) (invalidating one-house legislative vetoes as an
impermissible attempt by one house of Congress to amend a law unilaterally).
36 The present inquiry is not whether the Supreme Court would adjudicate this question. It very
well might not deem the question justiciable. The fact that a question may not be justiciable, however,
does not mean that it necessarily fails to present any substantial issues of constitutional moment. The
President and every United States Senator are duty bound to conform their acts to the mandates of the
Constitution itself, even if the Court is not watching.

20i7-=08
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against their applicability to the Senate confirmation process. Part II examines the
potential encroachments of a Senate moratorium on the President's exclusive power
to nominate Supreme Court Justices. Part III examines the potential impairments
that a Senate moratorium inflicts on the ability of the President and the Court to
perform their constitutional functions. Part IV surveys the history of unsuccessful
nominations to the Supreme Court and determines that a Senate moratorium on
even entertaining any nominations cannot find a constitutional safe harbor in
tradition.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS

The separation of powers is a constitutional feature, not a formality. Certain
purposes are served by disaggregating federal powers and distributing them among
three branches of government. This separation seeks to prevent the tyranny that
might arise from the consolidation of power in one officer or institution and makes
the effective exercise of power dependent upon the cooperation of more than one
branch of government." In addition, its division of labor allows each branch to be
specially designed for exercise of its particular power." Clear distinctions in
authority also facilitate accountability." The separation of powers is a significant
constitutional protection and one that may constrain the Senate's most aggressive
exercises of the confirmation power.

A. The Appointment offustices
The appointment of Supreme Court Justices implicates a complex allocation of
powers and prerogatives. It involves three branches of government in the exercise of
two great powers. 0 Specifically, the President and the Senate exercise the executive
power to appoint federal officials, 4 1 and the officials whom they appoint in this
instance wield the judicial power "to say what the law is." 42 The potential for
dashes over the proper allocation of power is apparent.
By design, the President has the preeminent role in the appointment of federal
officers, including Supreme Court Justices. 43 Artide 11 of the Constitution not only
vests "[t]he executive Power" in the President," but also imposes upon the chief
executive the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."4 5 This
general grant of authority, James Madison thought, might have been sufficient

' Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756-58 (1996).
* Id. at 757-58.

40 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Id.
SeeMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
45 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
41

42
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alone to empower the President to appoint federal officers," but at least "to prevent
doubts and misconstructions," 47 Article II addresses the appointment power
specifically. 48 Although the task of appointing "inferior Officers" may be delegated
by law to other actors, Article II directs that the President "shall appoint" all the
principal "Officers of the United States," including "Judges of the supreme
Court."49 Appointing these officers is a basic executive power, which the mandatory
language would seem to render obligatory. Indeed, the President's duty to appoint
principal officers may be understood as just a specific instance of his general duty to
ensure the faithful execution of the laws, including the law establishing a Supreme
Court with nine members.5 0
The executive power to appoint principal officers is not, however, a unilateral
one. It is true that appointing inferior officers may be delegated to "the President
alone,"" but for the appointment of principal officers, the Constitution allocates
the Senate a crucial role in the exercise of this executive power. Article II directs
that the President "shall nominate"52 persons to serve as principal officers, but
unless making merely temporary appointments "during the Recess of the Senate,""
the President may not actually appoint principal officers at will. Rather, the
President "shall appoint" them only "by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate."5 4 Only then is the President charged to "Commission" appointees as
"Officers of the United States." 5
The Constitution thus interposes a kind of veto between the nomination of
candidates for principal offices, including Supreme Court Justices, and the actual
appointment and commissioning of them by the President. This veto is assigned to
the Senate exclusively.s 6 The Constitution does not provide any formal mechanism
for the President to appeal from the Senate to the House of Representatives, to the
Supreme Court, to a privy council, to the States, or to any other body. Unlike the
President's conditional veto of a bill, which may be overridden by Congress,5 7 the
Senate's veto of a nomination is absolute.s5 It is a potent check on the President's
exercise of the appointment power.

46 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66-67 (Max Farrand ed., Yale

Univ. Press 1911) (June 1, 1787).
47 Id. at 67.
48 See U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2,

cl. 2.

49 id.

.

so See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief
Justice of the United States and eight associate justices . .
5
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52
d.
S3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
ss U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
56 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
5
See Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn't Have to Act on Merrick Garland's
Nomination,
ATLANTIC
(May
15,
2016),
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Although this division of the appointment power between two branches of
government is loosely characterized as part of the separation of powers, it might be
described with greater precision as an element of the system of checks and balances.
The allocation of distinct roles in the appointment process to the President and the
Senate does not actually separate any of the three great powers from each other:
legislative, executive, and judicial. Rather, granting the Senate a veto over
presidential appointments amounts to a division of one power-the executive
power-between two branches of government (or at least a branch and a half).
When the Senate advises and consents to presidential appointments, it is not
exercising legislative power; it is partaking in the exercise of the appointment
power, a quintessentially executive power. The Senate itself has always
distinguished between its "executive sessions," during which it considers
59
nominations, and its "legislative sessions," during which it considers legislation.
The Senate even documents its executive proceedings in a separate journal.' While
the Senate's prerogative to veto presidential appointments serves as a check on the
power of the President, it is not technically a separation of the great powers. Still, it
does entail an important separation of specific powers within the exercise of the
executive power of appointment.
Although disputes centered on the respective interests of the President and the
Senate in defining the boundary between their roles in the appointment process
raise interbranch separation of powers questions wholly within one of the great
powers, these boundary disputes can nevertheless give rise to their own separation
of powers questions. Similar boundary disputes as to the respective powers of
Congress and the President in exercising the legislative power certainly have. If the
President does not sign a bill within the constitutionally prescribed ten-day period
after it is presented to him, does the bill become a law without his signature if
Congress has adjourned for an intersession recess when the signing period expires?
No.6' May the President exercise a line-item veto over specific appropriations in
one bill? No.62 May Congress exercise a legislative veto over the actions of
administrative agencies without presenting its reversal of the administrative
decision to the President in a bill for approval or veto? No.63 Must a proposed
constitutional amendment approved by the requisite supermajorities in Congress be
presented to the President for approval or veto before submission to the states for
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/senate-obama-merrick-garland-supreme-courtnominee/482733/ [https://perma.cc/X8M2-A97C].
s9

The

Senate

in

Executive

Session,

U.S.

SENATE,

https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Feature-HomepageExecutiveSessions.
htm [https://perma.cc/PTN5-BD3H] (last visited Feb. 14,2018).
6 Senate Executive journal, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwej.html
[https://perma.cc/ZQM2-MRUQ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
61 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.; Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 672, 692 (1929) (holding
that Congress's adjournment prevented the President from returning the bill within the ten-day period
and therefore that the bill did not become law).
62 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,448-49 (1998).
63 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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ratification? No. 6 4 Interbranch disputes over the allocation of distinct roles in the
exercise of the executive power of appointment are similar.6 ' They too are subject a
to separation of powers analysis, even though only the executive power is at issue.
In addition, however, when the subject of the appointment power is the
Supreme Court, the interbranch dispute concerns more than the interbranch
sharing of the executive power. Rather, when appointments to the Supreme Court
are at issue, the exercise of the executive power of appointment by the President
and the Senate has potentially serious ramifications for the Supreme Court's
exercise of one of the other three great powers: the judicial power. While the power
to appoint Supreme Court Justices may lie within the executive power, it is situated
66
just inside the frontier between the executive power and the judicial power. Like
the fabled defendant whose actions on one side of a state line cause injuries on the
other, the exercise of the executive power of appointment can have significant
impacts on the judicial side of the boundary separating the executive power from
the judicial. The exercise of the power to appoint Supreme Court Justices, even if
purely executive, is obviously relevant to the exercise of the judicial power.
In contrast to disputes between the President and the Senate over the division
of authority within the executive power of appointment, disputes centered on the
interests of the judicial branch in how the President and Senate exercise the
appointment power represent the more standard type of separation of powers
question. These interbranch disputes involve managing the boundary between two
great powers: executive and judicial. The question is whether the separation of
powers may impose limits on the exercise of the executive power of appointing
Supreme Court Justices to avoid negative impacts on the Court's exercise of the
judicial power.
These different allocations of power surrounding the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices can raise serious separation of powers questions. Although
separation of powers law exhibits some well-known methodological incoherence, 67
two general principles have nevertheless emerged from it. First, one branch of
government may not encroachupon a constitutional power that belongs exclusively
to another branch." Second, even when exercising its own power, one branch of
government may not unduly impair the ability of another branch to perform its
own essential functions.6 9 The first of these principles requires each branch to stay

See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798).
See generally NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (challenging the President's
appointment power under the Recess Appointments Clause).
6 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalsm in Separation-ofPowersAnalysis: Refrnning the Appointments PowerAfter Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 152223 (2015).
67 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of PowersJurisprudenceIs So Abysmal, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506 (1989); Krotoszynski, supra note 66; M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real
Separationin Separation of-Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000); John F. Manning, Separation of
Powers as OrdinaryInterpretation,124 HARV. L. REv. 1939 (2011).
6" See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
64
65
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in its own lane on the governance highway, while the second principle adds that
each branch must avoid obstructing those in the neighboring lanes. A workable
system requires both principles.
The anti-encroachment principle enforces the constitutional allocation of a
specific power exclusively to one branch of government." Its resolution typically
turns on a formalist characterization of the specific power as legislative, executive,
or judicial and thus as belonging to that respective branch.7 For example, the
power to seize the nation's steel mills in order to prevent a work stoppage from
impeding war production has been characterized as a legislative power and thus
72
may not be exercised by the President without congressional authorization. The
power to extend official recognition to a foreign country, in contrast, has been
characterized as an executive power, so the President must be allowed to exercise
that power without congressional intrusion.7 ' As the Court has put it in another
context, "The 'judicial [p]ower'. . . can no more be shared with the Executive
Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto
power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a
Presidential veto." 74 When the Constitution definitively allocates certain powers to
75
each of the branches, that allocation is binding.
The second type of separation of powers dispute is different, as is its associated
functionalist methodology.7' Even when one branch of government is otherwise
acting within the scope of its allocated powers, it may not exercise those powers in
a way that unduly "impair[s] another [branch] in the performance of its
constitutional duties."7 7 Resolving this type of dispute has required a two-step
balancing test: whether the behavior of one branch has sufficiently impaired the
operation of another branch to raise a genuine constitutional question and, if so,
whether the impairing branch has a constitutionally sufficient justification for the
burden it has imposed on the other.7 In the normal course of trying a criminal
case, for example, a federal court seeking to subpoena tape recordings of private
conversations between the President and his aides usually may proceed because the
Judiciary's duty to provide a criminal defendant with compulsory process to obtain
exculpatory evidence typically justifies the possible chilling of candor in executive
conversations.7 ' But the court must carefully avoid unnecessary disclosures of

70 See Krotoszynski, supranote 66, at 1527-28.

71 See id.
n Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
7 Zivotofsky exrel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015).
7 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
7s See id.

' Krotoszynski, supra note 66, at 1528-29 (discussing functionalism).
n Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 542
U.S. 367, 382 (2004); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
690-91 (1988); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
78 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 531-35.
7 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702-07.
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sensitive national security matters.so The ultimate question is whether one branch
has gone so far in the exercise of its own power as to undulyimpair another branch
in the exercise of its power.8
The complex allocations of power surrounding the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices might produce either type of separation of powers dispute-or at
least the disputes might be conceptualized in either way. The first form of dispute
would center on a claim that the President or the Senate has encroachedon power
that definitively belongs solely to the other or that either has encroached on power
that definitively belongs to the Supreme Court. The second form of dispute would
center on a claim that the President or the Senate has unduly impaired the other in
the exercise of its respective powers or that either of them has unduly impaired the
ability of the Court to exercise its powers. The first type of dispute would typically
trigger a formalist categorization of the competing powers and a policing of the
boundary between them, while the second type of dispute would typically trigger a
functionalist analysis of the magnitude of any interbranch impairment and the
weightiness of the justifications for it.
The boundary between the power of the President to appoint principal officers
and the prerogative of the Senate to veto their nominations is not dearly marked.82
A Supreme Court nomination, moreover, adds an important additional dimension
to the question. Supreme Court nominations involve the selection of the highest
officers of a third branch of the government, a branch whose independence Article
III of the Constitution endeavors to shield from the other two branches." Perhaps
for good reason, Article II explicitly identifies "Judges of the supreme Court" as a
distinct category of appointees,84 whose proper method of appointment the
Framers debated specifically." However aggressively the Senate may deal with the
President in the case of an executive branch nomination, there may be legitimate
questions about the scope of its discretion when considering Supreme Court
nominations. May the Senate, for instance, withhold consent to a Supreme Court
nominee as leverage to secure the President's capitulation in a dispute over some
wholly unrelated matter, such as cutting taxes or raising the debt ceiling? May the
Senate select its own candidate for a Supreme Court vacancy and refuse even to
consider anyone else whom the President might nominate? May the Senate adopt
rules that summarily dispose of any Supreme Court nomination that fails to meet
certain criteria? May the Senate impose a moratorium on even considering any
Supreme Court nomination made by a particular sitting President? These questions
are hardly answered by the bare constitutional phrase, "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate,"' even if read in conjunction with the Article I provision
See id. at 712-16.
See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 532-33.
See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
83 U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1.
84 U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2.
s See infra Section II.A.
86 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
8o
8I
82
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authorizing the Senate to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings."" Such
questions implicate serious separation of powers considerations.
Answering such questions, however, requires considering not only the abstract
principles of encroachment and impairment, but also history. Even if a practice
appears to meet the test for an impermissible encroachment or impairment and
thus may constitute a prima facie violation of the separation of powers, a crucial
factor in determining the constitutionality of a practice is historical precedent." An
affected branch's acquiescence in a past practice stands as a tradition that provides a
validating safe harbor for what might otherwise be deemed a violation of the
separation of powers. A key final inquiry thus must be whether a tradition of
Senate moratoriums on Supreme Court nominations exists such that the
contemporary imposition of one may be saved by tradition from constitutional
invalidity under separation of powers principles."

B. Availability
A Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations cannot violate the
separation of powers if it is not subject to a separation of powers analysis in the first
place. Commentators have offered two reasons why a Senate moratorium cannot
trigger any significant separation of powers question, but neither rationale is
persuasive.
i. The Senate's Confirmation Discretion Is Absolute
Perhaps the principal defense of the Senate's power to impose a moratorium on
Supreme Court nominations by the incumbent President rests on the notion that
the Senate has absolute discretion in exercising its prerogative to advise and consent
to the nominations.' While the argument merits serious consideration, it
ultimately overstates the scope of the Senate's discretion. The Senate's prerogative
to confirm or reject Supreme Court nominations is not absolute and immune to all
constitutional constraint.
To be sure, no one should minimize the sweeping discretion that the
Constitution gives the Senate in exercising its confirmation power to promote its
own preferences in an interbranch dispute over a nomination. Opposing a nominee
should be seen as a broadly legitimate assertion of senatorial power, and resistance
to that power is left mostly to the counter-assertion of presidential power. As with
the President's ability to wave the veto pen to influence legislation, outcomes in the

87

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
" NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559-60 (2014) (collecting cases); see generalyCurtis
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, HistoricalGloss and the Separation ofPowers, 126 HARV. L. REv.
411 (2012).
* See infra PartIV.
90 See supra note 21-24 and accompanying text.
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appointment process have and will reflect the dynamic balance of power between
the branches with few, if any, rules and, at best, only glancing judicial review.
It is not extremist to suppose that there is no constitutional limit to the
Senate's ability to obstruct the process of filling vacancies on the Supreme Court if
that is its will. The confirmation power is clearly broad. No obvious limitation
appears in its grant, which stipulates merely that the President shall appoint new
Justices "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate."' Still, a basic
structural feature of the Constitution is the separation of powers, and it does place
implicit constitutional limits on the exercise of power by each branch of the federal
government. If there is any limit to the Senate's ability to obstruct the process of
filling vacancies on the Supreme Court, the separation of powers seems one of the
likelier sources of it.
True, the Constitution explicitly authorizes the Senate to "determine the Rules
of its Proceedings."9 2 This delegation of authority gives the Senate broad discretion
"to determine how and when to conduct its business,"93 and this discretion extends
to the Senate's performance of its confirmation function.94 If this discretion were so
broad as to be immune from all constitutional constraints, it would not be
theoretically possible for the separation of powers to limit the Senate's discretion in
dealing with Supreme Court nominations. But the Senate's discretion is not
absolute; it is subject to constitutional constraints.
Some of these constitutional constraints are so obvious that they go almost
unnoticed. The Constitution stipulates, for instance, that a majority of the Senate
is necessary for a quorums and that the Senate must keep a journal.16 In addition,
each Senator gets a vote," the Vice President may cast a tie-breaking vote, 98 and a
sufficient number of Senators may demand a recorded vote. 99 There is no credible
argument that the Senate's discretion to set its own rules authorizes it to change
these constitutionally established quorum, voting, and documentation
requirements" or that the phrase "by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate" preempts their application to the confirmation process.10
91 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
93 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 5,

cl. 2).

See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 27-29, 33 (1932).
9s U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
9

96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see, e.g, 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-30 (Duff Green 1828) (Sept. 26, 1789) (recording
the confirmation of the first nominees to the Supreme Court).

97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
"n See, e.g., Thomas Confirmation Vote,

C-SPAN

(Oct.

15,

1991),

https://www.c-

span.org/video/?22041-1/thomas-confirmation-vote [https://perma.cc/RC74-FASY] (showing Vice
President Dan Quayle presiding over the close vote to confirm Justice Thomas, Majority Leader
requesting recorded vote, and individual Senators casting votes); 137 CONG. REC. 26,354 (1991)

(noting that Vice President Dan Quayle presided over the close confirmation vote for Justice Thomas).
'0' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Other constitutional limitations may be less obvious. Article VI of the
Constitution expressly stipulates that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office ... under the United States."1 0 2 The precise scope of
this protection may be debatable,' 03 but if the concept of a forbidden "religious
Test" is broad enough to include compelling a nominee to make a pre-confirmation
declaration of religious belief,' 04 probing a nominee's religious beliefs during a
confirmation hearing,' or withholding confirmation because of a nominee's
religious identity,' 6 then Article VI would necessarily constrain the Senate's
discretion to regulate its own proceedings during the confirmation process. The
anti-Semitic hostility toward the confirmation of Justice Louis D. Brandeiso
illustrates the danger of interpreting the Senate's confirmation discretion so
absolutely as to immunize even religious discrimination from constitutional
condemnation. Would it really be constitutional for the Senate to ignore Article VI
and refuse to acknowledge a Supreme Court nominee because she is Muslim?'0o
The Court itself has recognized that the Senate's rulemaking discretion is
subject to constitutional constraints. In UnitedStates v. Baln, the Court upheld a
federal statute against the claim that it had supposedly passed the House of
Representatives without either a quorum or a sufficient majority.' 09 Although the
Court reasoned that either house could adopt any method of polling reasonably
102 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
13 Attached to the clause requiring state and federal officials to swear an oath of fidelity to the
Constitution, the protection against religious tests most obviously makes it unconstitutional to condition
the receipt of a commission on a declaration of religious belief. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
493-95 (1961); see also, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The No Rehgious Test Clause and the Constitution of
Relhgous Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone ofltself 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987); Daniel
L. Dreisbach, The Constitution'sForgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI Religious
Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261 (1996). Less clear is whether the Article VI protection against
religious tests extends a step further to exclusions from office that are based on a person's religious stafus
but that do not involve any compulsory declaration of belief. See generaly McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.

618 (1978).
10 It would seem immaterial whether such a declaration is exacted as a condition for being
confirmed or, as in Torcaso, as a condition for being commissioned. 367 U.S. at 489. The effect would
appear to be the same. If the purpose of the protection is to prevent the exclusion of people from office
on the basis of religion, the exclusion is the same in either case, and even if the purpose of the protection
is merely to avoid inducing a false declaration, the false declaration is induced in either case.
'0' See, e.g., Emma Green, Bernie Sanders's Rehgious Test for Christiansin Public Offic, THE
ATLANTIC (June 8,2017),https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/bernie-sanders-chrisGreenblatt,
Jonathan A.
[https://perma.cc/DZ3C-29ND];
van-hollen-russell-vought/529614/
Feinstein, Durbin Dangerously Close to Pushing Religious Test on Judge, THE HILL (Sept. 15, 2017,
http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/350930-feinstein-durbin-dangerously-close-to4:05
PM),
pushing-religious-test-on-judge [https://perma.cc/UP78-NTRJ].
106 See THOMAS KARFUNKEL &THOMAS W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT: ANTI-SEMITISM AND
THE APPOINTMENT OFJEWS TO THE SUPREME COURT 37-58 (1978).
107 See id.
" Cf Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 passin (1979) (holding that a congressional staffer who was
discharged because of her sex had a private right of action under the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause against the Member of Congress who fired her).

`o9 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3-4,6, 9 (1892).
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calculated to ascertain the presence of a quorum, the rulemaking discretion was not
boundless.110 As Justice Brewer explained for a unanimous Court, neither house
may "by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.""' In fact,
when the text of the Constitution contains a lacuna, the Court sometimes asserts
its power as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution to resolve the ambiguity in a
way that binds the respective house, rather than leave the question to the discretion
of that chamber." 2 Drawing on a variety of sources, for example, the Court further
held in Balhn that the majority requisite for passing a bill was a majority of the
quorum present, even if less than a majority of the whole membership of the
particular house."' The absence of any express specification, the Court reasoned,
meant that the Constitution embodied what the Court called "the general rule of
all parliamentary bodies . . . ."114
Though broad, the Senate's discretion in performing its confirmation function
is qualified, not absolute. It remains subject to constitutional constraints. It is
constrained by procedural requirements specified in Article I.11s It surely is
constrained by substantive protection against religious tests for public office."u'
According to Baln, the Senate's internal rules also must meet some minimum test
of basic rationality."' It seems doubtful that, despite these constitutional
limitations, the Senate's prerogative to confirm Supreme Court nominations
nevertheless transcends all potential separation of powers constraints.
ii. The Power to Reduce the Size of the Court
A second general defense of the Senate's power to impose a moratorium on
Supreme Court nominations is that the size of the Court's membership is not
constitutionally fixed."' Congress has the power to increase"' or, at least by

110 Id. at 5.
n Id.
112 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-50 (1969) (discussing the Court's authority

to "interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by
another branch").
u1 BalM, 144 U.S. at 6.
114 Id
us See generallyU.S. CONST. art. I.
116 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

n' United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
§ 1 (anticipating that the Court will consist of "Judges" but omitting to
specify how many); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 (presupposing that there would be a Chief
Justice and thus a multi-member Court).
"' CompareJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73, ("[T]he supreme court .. . shall
consist of a chief justice and five associate justices."), with Seventh Circuit Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2
Stat. 420, 421 (increasing the number of seats from six to seven).
11 See U.S. CONST. art. III,
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22
attrition,12o to decrease121 the number of seats on the Court.' A moratorium on
entertaining a nomination to fill a vacancy, the argument goes, is merely an
instance of the Senate effectively exercising this discretion to reduce the size of the

Court for a time.1

23

This argument misconceives the nature of that discretion. The number of seats
1 25
The
on the Court has been set by statute since 1789124 and remains so today.
number of seats may be changed, but it may not be changed by the Senate acting
unilaterally. If the Senate wishes to amend the Court's organic statute to either
increase or decrease the size of the Court's membership, the Senate must pass a bill,
get the House of Representatives to concur, and either get the President to assent
26
to the bill or else enact it (along with a supermajority of the House) over his veto.1
Circumvention of these requirements of bicameralism and presentment,
27
circumvention which the Framers took pains to forestall,1 violates the separation
of powers.12
In the case of increasing the size of the Court, the Senate's inability to make
the change alone is evident because an increase would require affirmative
lawmaking. No one imagines that the Senate could unilaterally add a tenth seat
to the current Court by passing a one-house resolution declaring a new seat to
exist and then inviting the President to submit a nomination to fill the new
vacancy."' When the Court was first established and its original statutory

120 SeeU.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (providing that Supreme CourtJustices "shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour" and that their salaries "shall not be diminished during their Continuance in

Office").
121 CompareTenth Circuit Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (setting the size of the
Court at one ChiefJustices and nine Associate Justices), wid>Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1,
14 Stat. 209, 209 ("[N]o vacancy in the office of associate justice of the supreme court shall be filled by
appointment until the number of associate justices shall be reduced to six.").
122 SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power to enact laws that are "necessary
and proper" for implementing the powers vested in any other "Department or Officer" of the federal
government).
1 SeeJeff Shesol, Wl RepublicansFight to Shrink the Supreme Court?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/will-republicans-fight-to-shrink-the-supreme2016),
court [https://perma.cc/NJX4-4F37].
124 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 1 (fixing the number of seats at six).
125 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (fixing the number of seats at nine).
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ... shall be presented to the President of the

United States."). But see Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 378, 381-82 (1798) (holding that
constitutional amendments approved by Congress under Article V were not subject to the presentment
requirement).

" See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
956-59 (1983).
'29 Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014)
(disfavoring interpretations of the Constitution that would permit the marginalization
constitutional institution that was given a role in the appointment process).
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membership set at six,13 o the Senate complied with the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment.'' Each subsequent increase in the membership of
the Court has similarly been accomplished by passage of a bill by both houses of
Congress and approval by the President.'32 Even President Franklin Roosevelt
never imagined that his Court-packing plan, which would have increased the total
number of Justices, could have been adopted by unilateral Senate action. 13 He
deliberately began the lawmaking process in the Senate, but only because the plan
was opposed by key leaders in the House.'34
The proposition that the Senate may not unilaterally reduce the size of the
Court is just as certain, even if it is less obvious because a moratorium on
nominations would seem to allow the Senate to achieve the goal as a de facto
matter by passively undercutting the number of statutorily prescribed seats through
confirmation inaction. Purporting to reduce the size of the Court by inaction,
however, would deprive the House of Representatives as well as the President of
their constitutional prerogatives to approve or reject the proposed reduction. The
statutorily prescribed size of the Court has been reduced twice in history and in
both instances the Senate complied with the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.1 3s

The first instance came in 1801, when President John Adams and his defeated
Federalist Party used their final, lame duck session of Congress to enact a law
reducing the membership of the Court by attrition from six seats to five."3 6 That
effort to preserve a Federalist majority on the Court may have been unseemly, but
at least they complied with the prescribed lawmaking process. Indeed, the Senate
was not even the dominant chamber. The bill originated in the House, ' 3 and the

' Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
"' See 1 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 43 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1820) (July 20, 1789) (sending the bill to the House for
concurrence); id. at 82-83 (Sept. 19, 1789) (concurring with most House amendments to the bill); 1
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 119-20 (Washington,
Gales & Seaton 1826) (Sept. 23, 1789) (presenting the bill to the President for approval); 1 JOURNAL
OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 87 (Washington,
Gales & Seaton 1820) (Sept. 24, 1789) (receiving notice of President's approval of bill).
132 Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44; Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1,
12 Stat. 794, 794; Eighth and Ninth Circuits Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176; Seventh Circuit
Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421.
133 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-35 (1995).

Id. at 135.
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89 (reducing the number of seats from six to five
upon the next vacancy); Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (reducing the
number of seats from seven to six upon the next vacancy).
136 Judiciary Act of 1801 § 3; Jed Glickstein, Note, After AJdnight: The CircuitJudgesand the
Repeal ofthe JudiciaryActofl801, 24 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 543, 543-44,547 (2012).
13' 3 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 743
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1826) (Dec. 19, 1800).
134
13S
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Senate merely concurred without amendment."' The bill was presented to the
President," and he signed it into law.14
The second instance came in 1866, when the Republican Congress enacted a
law reducing the authorized membership of the Court by attrition from ten seats to
seven.'41 This effort also may have been an unseemly tactic in the Congress's
intense conflict with President Andrew Johnson, but at least they complied with
the prescribed lawmaking process. Again, the bill did not even originate in the
Senate,' 42 but the Senate did substantially amend this one. Although the
House-approved version would have reduced the Court only from ten members to
nine,'43 the Senate went further and amended the bill to reduce the Court from ten
members to seven,'" a change in which the House acquiesced.' 4 5 Notably, despite
the intense interbranch conflict, the bill was presented to the President,'" and he
signed it into law.' 47 Crucially, the Senate did not simply impose a unilateral
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations, even though a vacancy in the
membership of the Court existed at the timel4 8 and the President had submitted a
nomination to fill it. 4 9 Rather, the Senate worked with the House to reduce the
statutory membership of the Court and presented the bill to the President.'s
On still another occasion, House involvement in the process was crucial in
protecting the Court, as the House prevented the Senate from manipulating the
Court's seats as a way to dispense with an unwelcome nomination. In 1835, the
Senate's anti-Jacksonian majority delayed consideration of Jackson's nomination of
Roger B. Taney of Maryland to fill the Associate Justice vacancy caused by the
resignation of Justice Gabriel Duvall, a Marylander who had presided over the
federal circuit for Maryland and Delaware.' During the delay, the Senate drafted
and passed a bill to merge Maryland and Delaware's circuit into the neighboring
1' 3 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 123 (Washington, Gales

&Seaton 1821) (Feb. 7, 1801).
"'9

3

JOURNAL

OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 800

(Washington, Gales &Seaton 1826) (Feb. 12, 1801).
140 Id. (Feb. 13, 1801).
141 Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209.
142 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3697 (1866); H.R. JOURNAL, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 335

(1866) (recording introduction of H.R. 334).
'43 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
14' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
145 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
146 H.R JOURNAL, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
147 Id. at 1087-88 (July 23, 1866).

1259 (1866).
3697-99 (1866).
3909 (1866).
1065 (July20, 1866).

148 Justice John Catron had died on May 30, 1865. Judges: Catron,John, FED. JUD. CTR., Catron,
John, https://www.fic.gov/history/judges/catron-john [https://perma.cc/J66K-NE4K] (last visited Feb.
16,2018).
149 14 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA 994 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Apr. 16, 1866) (receiving nomination of
Henry Stanberry).
s See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.

stJustin Crowe, Westward Expansion, PreappointmentPoltics, and the Making of the Southern
Slavehohding Supreme Court, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 90, 108 (2010).
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one, comprising Pennsylvania and New Jersey. That circuit already had a sitting
52
Justice to preside over it, Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania.' The Senate bill would
also create two new Mississippi Valley circuits, which would need new Justices
from those places to preside over those circuits."s Although creating "western"
circuits had been a legitimate need for years, and even though the bill would have
resulted in a net increase in the size of the Court from seven to eight members to
accommodate the expansion, it also would have had the convenient side-effect of
obviating the need for a Maryland-based Justice-namely, pending nominee
Taney.' 4 The House debated the bill, understood its implications, considered a
version that preserved the Maryland circuit, and ultimately declined to pass any
version at all.' Only when the bill had clearly failed in the House did the Senate
resume its consideration of the Taney nomination, which it affirmatively voted to
postpone on the last day of the 23rd Congress.' 56 The incoming Senate of the 24th
Congress would be significantly less anti-Jacksonian than the expiring one,"s' and it
would confirm Jackson's second nomination of Taney-this time to replace the
recently deceased John Marshall as ChiefJustice.'s
Bicameralism and presentment are not optional steps when the Senate wishes
to change a considered policy that has been enacted into law. Neither the House
nor the President may be denied a role in approving the change of policy, and that
proposition is true whether the Senate wishes to increase or reduce the size of the
Court. Although the Senate's prerogative to advise and consent to Supreme Court
nominations may be broad enough to support a unilateral moratorium, it is
decidedly not because the Senate has a unilateral power to change the statutorily
fixed size of the Court.'s The fact that the size of the Court is not constitutionally
prescribed means that it may be increased or reduced. It does not mean that the
152 Id. at 108 & n.146 (discussing consolidation of the two Eastern circuits); id. at 110-11
(discussing the Senate's passage of the circuit reform).
113 Id. at 110.
154 Id. at 110-11.
1ss Id. at 111.
156 4

JOURNAL OF THE ExEcuTivE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 484 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Mar. 3, 1835) (voting 24-21 to postpone the
nomination indefinitely).
1s7 See Crowe, supra note 151, at 113-14 (discussing the Whig party's loss of
control).
15

4 JOURNAL OF THE EXEcUrIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 520-21 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Mar. 15, 1836); Nominations, Chapter
5:
Andrew
Jackson,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Nominations.htm#5
[https://perma.cc/H9UZ-5DLX] (last visited Feb. 17, 2018).
s' A moratorium linked to the duration of a particular President's term or to one party's control of
the presidency is not grounded in any neutral policy concerning the proper size of the membership of
the Court. Still, the Constitution generally does not forbid the exercise of its granted powers with the
ulterior motive of advancing a purely partisan objective. The discretion to set the size of the Court and
the prerogative to advise and consent to nominations may not be any exception. Exploiting either power
for partisan ends may be unseemly but may not be unconstitutional. Still, it requires some suspension of
disbelief to imagine that a moratorium on nominations from a particular President or party represents a
bona fide policy choice about the appropriate size of the Court.
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Senate may disregard the statutorily entrenched judgment of the House and
President as to the proper size and change it unilaterally.
II. ENCROACHMENT
The action of one branch of government may violate the separation of powers
either by encroaching upon the power of another or by impairing another in the
exercise of its power. 6 o A Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations may
implicate the first of these principles. It may impermissibly encroach upon the
power of the President to make Supreme Court nominations.
The anti-encroachment principle recognizes that one branch's exclusive power
may not be shared with another branch.' 6 ' The judicial power of federal courts, for
example, "can no more be shared" with the Executive Branch "than 'the Chief
Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the
62
Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto."1
While the examples easily could be multiplied, the point is simple-the
Constitution allocates power for a reason, and its allocations are binding. Power
that it allocates exclusively to one branch may not be re-allocated to another,
whether by power-sharing agreements or by the unilateral negation, usurpation,
6
dispossession, repudiation, or abdication of power. 1
This anti-encroachment principle applies to the President's power to make
Supreme Court nominations. A Senate moratorium on such nominations for as
long as the incumbent President remains in office may constitute an impermissible
attempt by the Senate to re-allocate the President's exclusive power to make those
nominations. This encroachment may be conceptualized in two ways. First, such a
moratorium may impermissibly deny effect to the constitutional act of making a
nomination, and, thus encroach upon the President's power by repudiation.
Second, a Senate moratorium may impermissibly superintend or transfer the
nomination power by "President-shopping" for a preferred nominator to exercise
the power in a preferred way.' 64 On this latter view, a moratorium may encroach
upon the President's nomination power by usurpation.

A. Repudiation
At a minimum, a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations by the
incumbent President may constitute a repudiation of his power in violation of the
separation of powers. Like Congress enacting a law or a court entering a final
judgment in a case, the President submitting a Supreme Court nomination to the
See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
162 See Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683,
704 (1974)).
163 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976).
164 See Clark, supts note 33, at 744 (defining "President-shopping").
16o
161
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Senate is a constitutional act within the scope of his exclusive power. As in the
other examples, the separation of powers requires the other branches to recognize
the act and give it full effect. 65 To borrow a phrase, each branch must, at least as a
general principle, give fil faith and credit1 66 to the constitutional acts of the other
branches when done within the scope of their exclusive power. A Senate
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations denies that recognition and effect to
any nomination the President submits. In that way, the moratorium may
impermissibly repudiate his exclusive power to make Supreme Court nominations.
This principle is not novel. It is settled law, for example, that the separation of
powers forbids Congress to deny effect to final judgments rendered by a federal
court.' 6' Although Congress may amend the substantive law regulating a dispute

while the case remains pending, it may not retroactively re-open a judgment that
has become final.'16 Congress is obliged to give effect to the Judiciary's exclusive
constitutional act of rendering final judgment in adjudicating a case or controversy
over which a federal court has jurisdiction.1 6 1 By the same token, the Judiciary has a
reciprocal obligation toward Congress when adjudicating a particular case or
controversy. If Congress retroactively amends the substantive law governing the
dispute, the Judiciary is obliged to give effect to the law, if valid, and apply it to any
pending case that has not yet culminated in a final judgment. 170 The Judiciary must
give effect to the constitutional acts of Congress and vice versa. Neither may
repudiate the acts of the other as if they do not exist or have no force.
This principle also applies to the exclusive constitutional acts of the President.
It is now settled law that a President's issuance of a pardon to a person guilty of a
federal crime is final and binding on the other branches.17' They must recognize it
and give it full effect. The Judiciary must comply with the terms of the pardon in
an attempted prosecution of the recipient or in any proceeding seeking his release
from custody.1 72 Congress must also recognize a presidential pardon and give it full

16 See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84, 2095 (2015) (citing
and discussing "Justice Jackson's ... tripartite framework" in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
166 Cf U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) ("Judgments, within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution, may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by
another Department of Government.").
"' See Jennifer Mason McAward, Congrss's Power to Block Enforcement of Federal Court
Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1342-49 (2008).
...
Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19, 225-26 (1995).
169 Id. at 218-19.
170 See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1992); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 22627; Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273-80 (1994); United States v. Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103, 108-10 (1801).
171 See Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119-22 1925); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
380 (1867).
172 See Grossman, 267 U.S. at 113, 119-22; Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) at 380.
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effect."' In fact, Congress is even obliged to enact legislation, "if necessary," to
effectuate a pardon.'7 4 Passively doing nothing when doing something is necessary
to give a pardon effect amounts to an impermissible repudiation of the President's
exclusive power to issue pardons. As Justice Jackson has observed with respect to
the three branches of the federal government, the Constitution "contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government" and
'enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
7
reciprocity."' s
Like a presidential pardon, a presidential nomination is a formal constitutional
act of the President.' 76 It is not a simple message delivered to the Senate. It is a
legal act with constitutional consequences. As a formal constitutional act,
moreover, it is entitled to as much recognition and effect as a presidential pardon.
The difficult question is what effect a presidential nomination-particularly a
Supreme Court nomination-must be given. A nomination is not constitutionally
entitled to Senate approval, for the Senate has the discretion to reject any
nomination it wishes.' 7 7 Short of approval, the most obvious effect that a
nomination-particularly a Supreme Court nomination-might be constitutionally
entitled to receive from the Senate is a confirmation vote.178 Perhaps the President
is constitutionally entitled to an up-or-down vote on Supreme Court nominations,
with a chance for supporters to demand a recorded vote' 7 1 in order to hold Senators
accountable for rejecting a good nomination. Although the tradition of Senate
behavior in handling Supreme Court nominations may fall short of supporting the
proposition that such a nomination is entitled to a formal confirmation vote, the
Senate still may have affirmative obligations, as with a pardon, to do more than
ignore it and pretend that it does not exist. To refuse to even to entertain it, to
commence no vetting, and to have no formal committee proceedings, may fail to
afford a nomination, particularly of a candidate for appointment to the Supreme
Court, the degree of recognition and effect that the separation of powers requires.
Unless the Senate's confirmation power is broad enough to include sharing in the
President's power to nominate Supreme Court Justices, a moratorium on
nominations may unconstitutionally fail to give requisite effect to such a
nomination.
The essential question is the extent to which the President's nomination power
is truly exclusive and thus protected from Senate encroachment by repudiation. As
the Supreme Court recently observed, "The Constitution vests the power of

...United

380.

States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141-42 (1872); Galand, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at

Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
176 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
17 See id.
178 Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
179 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
174
17
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nomination in the President alone... .""s As the Appointments Clause prescribes,

"

the President "shall nominate" federal officers, including "Judges of the supreme
Court."' It is only the President's power to appoint them to office that must be
done "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate."1 82 The Senate may
reject his nominees, but it has no explicitly articulated role in selecting them.
This language was no accident. The Framers of the Constitution intended the
President to have the exclusive power to choose nominees without Senate
interference. Throughout the Convention, the primary dispute concerning the
selection of Supreme Court Justices was whether to vest the power to appoint them
in the President or in the Senate.' The Framers ultimately wanted accountability
for the choice focused squarely on the President, with the Senate providing security
against a poor presidential choice. 8
The issue was not necessarily that the Framers imagined the Senate would be
unfit to select Supreme Court Justices. Throughout much of the Constitutional
Convention, in fact, senatorial appointment was the prevailing choice of the
delegates. The Virginia Plan, from which the delegates worked, called for
congressional appointment of Supreme Court Justices.' The delegates soon
modified that proposal to eliminate any role for the House of Representatives and
vest the appointment of Supreme Court Justices in the Senate exclusively.'"' This
method of judicial appointment by a legislative chamber was familiar to the
delegates. In the early 1780s, the judges of the first national high court, the Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture,'1 7 had been nominated, chosen by ballot, and
commissioned by the Continental Congress' and later by the Confederation

180

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,2558-59 (2014) (emphasis in original).
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

181 U.S. CONST.
182

id.

See
Nominations,
Chapter 2: Constitutional Convention,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Nominations.htm#2
[https://perma.cc/E3VN-HY25] (last visited Feb. 17, 2018).
183

U.S.

SENATE,

1841d
1 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (May 29, 1787).
1s6 Id. at 116, 119-21 (June 5, 1787) (striking
appointment by"the national Legislature"); id at 230,
232-33 (June 13, 1787) (adopting appointment by the Senate).
117 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶¶ 1-2 (authorizing creation of courts); 28
U.S.C. § 6 (2012) (regulating records of this former court); Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 54, 55-56 (1795).
188 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 61, 64 (Gaillard Hunt
ed.,
Gov't. Printing Office 1910) (Jan. 15, 1780) (seeking nominations for first set of judges); id. at 77 (Jan.
20, 1780) (reporting list of nominees); id. at 79 (Jan. 22, 1780) (electing first set of judges); id at 121
(Feb. 2, 1780) (adopting form of commission); id. at 254 (Mar. 13, 1780) (receiving letter from one
designee declining appointment); id. at 322 (Apr. 1, 1780) (resolving to choose alternative judge); id. at
397 (Apr. 28, 1780) (electing alternative judge in lieu of designee who declined to serve); 17 id at 779
(Aug. 25, 1780) (resolving to elect new judge to fill vacancy); Letter from Samuel Huntington to Titus
Hosmer, William Paca, & George Wythe (Feb. 2, 1780), in 14 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 386 (Paul H. Smith et al. eds., Library of Congress 1987) (letter delivering
commissions to judge-designees).
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Congress.'"' Senatorial appointment of Supreme Court Justices remained the
approved choice of the delegates until nearly the end of the 1787 Convention.' 90
The primary alternative, presidential appointment of Supreme Court Justices,
had some support from the outset of the deliberations,' 9 ' but the choice between
the two methods of appointment eventually became a site of polarized conflict
between large states and small states.' 92 Delegates sparred over whether the Senate
or President would be more susceptible to making corrupt appointments, more
inclined to make geographically diverse appointments, or more accountable in the
event of bad appointments.' But, once the Convention adopted the Great
Compromise, which rejected proportional representation in the Senate in favor of
equal suffrage for small and large states;' 94 senatorial appointment of Supreme
Court Justices became more appealing to delegates from small states and less
appealing to delegates from large states. As Edmund Randolph candidly put it,
"[W]hen the [appointment] of the Judges was vested in the [Senate] . . . an
equality of votes had not been given to it.""' Once that decision was made,

the
Big Three-Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania-could no longer expect to
wield the same outsize influence in the Senate as they could anticipate in the
House.'96 The delegates also suspected-correctly, it turned out"'-that the
population advantage gave the large states a good chance of routinely holding the
presidency." Virginia delegate, James Madison, who had previously supported
18' 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 749 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
Gov't. Printing Office 1914) (Nov. 22, 1782) (resolving to elect new judges to fill vacancies); id. at 765
(Dec. 5, 1782) (filling vacancies on court by nomination and ballot).
190 See2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (Sept. 7, 1787) (adopting presidential appointment with Senate confirmation).
191 1 id at 119 (June 5, 1787) (noting the argument of James Wilson of Pennsylvania for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices by a single, accountable executive).

See, e.g., 2 id. at 1-2, 41-44, 80-83.
193 Id. at 41-44, 80-83.
192

194

MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91-105

(1913).

19s 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 43 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (July 18, 1787). Edmund Randolph was a Virginia delegate. FARRAND, supra note
194, at 8.
196 Under the initial apportionment established in the Constitution itself, these three states together
would command approximately forty percent of the House seats. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The
Big Three held twenty-six out of the sixty-five House seats. See id. In the reapportionment following
the first census, the proportion rose to nearly forty-four percent. See Apportionmentofthe US. House
ofRepresentatives, CENSUS.GOV 3-4 tbl.3 (Mar. 1998), https://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/CPH-

2-US.PDF [https://perma.cc/TZN2-97T3].
197 The first six Presidents would hail from either Virginia or Massachusetts. Timelne Guide to the
US. Presidents, SCHOLASTIC, https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/articles/teaching-content/timelineguide-us-presidents/ [https://perma.cc/C2DP-9DSP] (last visited Feb. 17, 2018).
198 While the delegates were considering alternatives to senatorial appointment of Supreme Court
Justices, they were almost simultaneously grappling with the method of electing the president. But
either of the competing options-election by Congress or by electors apportioned at least in part based
on population-would give a large state significantly greater influence than a small state. See 2 THE
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senatorial appointment of Supreme Court Justices,'" became a convert to
presidential appointment.2 0 0 Conversely, delegates from small states, whose New
20 1
became fans of senatorial
Jersey Plan had called for executive appointment,
appointment. Three different proposals to shift the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices from the Senate to the President failed in votes that tracked the division
between small states and large states.20 2 Senatorial appointment was reaffirmed over
the objections of the Big Three, 20 3 and the Committee of Detail incorporated it
into the draft Constitution.

2 04

What finally induced the delegates to shift the power of appointing Supreme
Court Justices from the Senate to the President was a desire to avoid conflicts of
interest. The issue arose from the allocation of the power to try impeachments.2 0 5
The delegates had initially opted to empower the Supreme Court to try all
impeachments, 206 but they soon realized that having the Court try impeachments
would be problematic in any instance in which one of its own members was the
subject of an impeachment trial. 207 The solution that emerged was to transfer the
impeachment trials of Supreme Court Justices to the Senate. 20 8 The avoidance of
that potential conflict of interest, however, created another one. If the Senate had
the power to appoint Supreme Court Justices, its deliberations in impeachment
trials of Supreme Court Justices might be tainted by the prospect that conviction
and removal would create a vacancy that the Senate itself would get to fill.209 The
delegates took this kind of potential conflict of interest seriously. A similar concern
about the Senate's impartiality during an impeachment trial of the President
prompted the delegates to shift the power to break presidential ties in the Electoral
College from the Senate to the House. 2 10 Thus, the Senate could not enable itself
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911)
(July 17, 1787) (rejecting direct popular election by a 9-to-i margin; rejecting state-appointed electors
by a 2-to-8 margin; and adopting congressional election unanimously); id. at 50 (July 19, 1787)
(reconsidering method of presidential election and adopting election by state-appointed electors); id. at
97-99 (July 24, 1787) (reconsidering method of presidential election and returning to congressional
election).

'9 1 id. at 120 (June 5, 1787).
200 2 id. at 42-43 (July 18, 1787) (proposing presidential appointment with the consent of only onethird of the Senate).
201 1 id. at 243-44 (June 15, 1787).
202 2 id. at 41, 44 (July 18, 1787) (recording rejection of James Wilson's proposal by all states but

Massachusetts and Pennsylvania); id. at 44 (recording rejection of Nathaniel Ghorum's proposal by all
states but Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and the fourth largest state, Maryland); id. at 82-83
(July 21, 1787) (recording rejection of James Madison's proposal by all states but Virginia,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania).
203

Id. at 83 (July 21, 1921).

204 Id. at 183 (Aug. 6, 1787) ("The Senate

of the United States shall have power.. to

appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court.").
205

See id. at 551-52 (Sept. 8, 1787).

206 Seeid. at 172-73 (reprinting the Committee of Detail's draft of the Constitution).
207 Id. at 551-52 (Sept. 8, 1787).
208 Id.

209 See id. at 41-44 (July 18, 1787).

2Id. at 573.
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to choose a new President by convicting and removing a sitting President. To avoid
a similar self-interested incentive to convict a Supreme Court Justice in an
impeachment trial, the delegates shifted the power to choose Supreme Court
Justices from the Senate to the President.21 ' To ensure that the Senate did not
benefit from convicting and removing a sitting Justice by getting to fill the resulting
vacancy, the delegates stripped the Senate of the power to appoint Justices of its
own choosing.
This point is crucial to understanding the distinction between the President's
power to nominate Supreme Court Justices and the Senate's prerogative to consent
to them before appointment. The Senate was to have no role in choosing Justices.
Placing the power to remove Justices in the same hands as the power choose
Justices posed risks that the Framers were unwilling to take. At the very least, the
power to choose a successor might bias senators in their impeachment trials of
Supreme Court Justices. Perhaps worse, the ability to remove and replace Justices
might undermine the judicial independence that the Framers dearly sought to
assure. One might scoff at the prospect today, since there has been no serious effort
at removing Justices through impeachment since the Senate acquittal of Justice
Samuel Chase in 1805.212 Part of the reason for that tradition against removals,
however, may be the Framers' choice to deprive the Senate of the power to replace
Supreme Court Justices. It is far from unrealistic to imagine the prospect of an
increase in the willingness of Congress to impeach and remove Supreme Court
Justices if congressional leaders understood that the Senate Majority Leader would
be able to choose the replacement Justice. In any event, the Framers dearly made
the policy decision to minimize improper impeachment temptations by depriving
the Senate of the power to choose Supreme Court Justices.
A final episode at the Convention further clarified the distinction between the
roles of the President and the Senate in nominating and confirming Supreme
Court Justices. Several delegates made a final effort to strip the Senate of the
prerogative even to consent to presidential nominations of executive branch officials
as well as judges.213 The proposal was to transfer the confirmation function
to a congressionally or senatorially appointed privy council that would be
structured like a mini-Senate inside the Executive Branch.214 In addition to
separation of powers and efficiency concerns,215 a principal criticism of Senate
confirmation of nominees was that it blurred the line of accountability for bad
appointments. 216 The prevailing rebuttal, however, was delivered most dearly by
Id. at 41-44 (July 18, 1787).
Valerie Strauss, Can a Supreme CourtJustice Be Forcibly Removed from the Bench? A Quick
Civics Lesson., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2015/12/12/can-a-supreme-court-justice-be-forcibly-removed-from-the-bench-a-quickcivics-lesson/iutm term=.f8ae931420ee [https://perma.cc/6EAD-TPQP].
213 See, e.g., id. at 328-29 (Aug. 18, 1787); id. at 538-39 (Sept.
7, 1787).
214 Id. at 329.
215 Id at 537-38 (Sept. 7, 1787).
216 Id. at 538-39.
211

212
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Governor Morris, who had previously advocated for a privy council217 but who had
changed his mind. He reported that a privy council had been debated in
as
rejected
and
committee
giving the President a way to shift blame and avoid accountability for bad
appointments.28 Presidential nomination and then appointment following Senate
confirmation, he explained, preserved accountability without giving the President
unchecked appointment power:
"[A]s the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and
as the Senate was to concur, there would be security."219 He added that
with the Confederation Congress's then existing practice of appointing
executive and judicial officers by nomination and election, "there [was]
no responsibility."220
This episode reinforces the inference that the Senate was to have no role in
choosing the candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court. Neither the
proponents nor the opponents of the privy council alternative denied the value of
presidential accountability for bad appointments. 22' The prevailing view, however,
was that Senate confirmation would not undermine presidential accountability
because, in Morris's words, "the President was to nominate" and the Senate was
merely to "concur" (or not). 2 2 2 Clear presidential accountability for bad
appointments depended crucially on the president bearing exclusive responsibility
in the selection of appointees. The participation of a privy council in choosing
appointees would give the President a ready scapegoat for bad choices, but so too
would a Senate role in the selection of nominees. The most the Framers were
willing to authorize the Senate to do was give "Advice," and even that function was
textually attached to the appointment power and textually separated from the

nomination power. 2 2 3
The actions and deliberations at the Constitutional Convention indicate that
the Framers sought to preclude the Senate from choosing Supreme Court Justices.
Senate involvement in the actual selection of nominees would improperly taint
Senate deliberations in impeachment trials of Supreme Court Justices and thereby
potentially undermine the independence of the Court. Such involvement would
also blur responsibility for bad selections and make it harder to hold the President
accountable. For these reasons, the Framers set out to make the presidential power
to nominate Supreme Court Justices exclusive, and they understood that it would
be exclusive.
217
218
219
220

Id. at 329, 342-44, 427.
Id. at 541-542 (Sept. 7, 1787).
Id. at 539.

d

Id. at 538-39, 541-42. But see id. at 539 (Elbridge Gerry expressing doubt as to whether
accountability was achievable).
222 Id. at 539; see also supra text accompanying
note 219.
223 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
221
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In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton addressed the appointment
power in general and emphasized this same point. In response to critics who argued
that Senate confirmation would undermine presidential accountability for
appointments, Hamilton stressed the exclusive nature of the President's power to
choose nominees:
"In the act of nomination, hisjudgment alone would be exercised; and as
it would be his sole duty to point out the man, who with the approbation
of the [S]enate should fill an office, his responsibility [for choosing a bad
nominee] would be as complete as if he were to make the final
appointment[]"
without any requirement of Senate confirmation. 22 4 Hamilton added that "the
225
Because of the
power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the [E]xecutive."
dear distinction between the President's power to nominate and the Senate's
prerogative to confirm, "[t]he blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the
[P]resident singly and absolutely[,]" while the Senate would only face either the
prospective "censure of rejecting a good [nomination]" or reproach "for approving"
a poor one. 226 Senate rejection of a President's nomination "c[ould] only be to make
place for another nomination by [the President]," for "[t]he person ultimately
appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first
degree."2 27 Hamilton dismissed the notion that the Senate could have any incentive
to reject presidential nominations "by the preference they might feel to another"
potential nominee "because they could not assure themselves, that the person they
might wish [to confirm] would be brought forward by a second or by any
subsequent nomination."2 2 8 Indeed, he wrote further that the Senate "could not
even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree
more acceptable to them . . .. "229 Hamilton therefore contemplated that the
President alone would choose nominees, and that the Senate's role was limited to
either approving or rejecting them, which it had to do with the understanding it
had no role in choosing nominees.
Expressions in ratification conventions were also consistent with this
understanding. In response to criticism that the Senate's role in appointments
would give it too much power, the consistent response was that the Senate had no
meaningful role in choosing nominees. In North Carolina, James Iredell explained
that "the Senate has no other influence but a restraint on improper appointments.
The President proposes such a man for such an office. The Senate has to consider
224

THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &James McClellan
eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2001) (emphasis added).
225 Id. No. 77, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton).
226
227

Id. at 397-98.
Id. NO. 76, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton).
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upon it. If they think him improper, the President must nominate another, whose
appointment ultimately again depends upon the Senate."23 0 Underscoring the
Senate's lack of agency in choosing nominees, Iredell firther explained that it
would do a Senator no good to reject one nominee in an effort to save the position
for a friend, for "[w]ere an office to be vacant, for which a hundred men on the
continent were equally well qualified, there would be a hundred chances to one
whether his friend would be nominated to it."23 1 In Pennsylvania, James Wilson
rejected the idea that a senator could bribe a member of the House of
Representatives with a federal appointment because "the President must nominate
before [federal officers] can be chosen. . . ."32 In New York, Chancellor Robert
Livingston made the same point by resisting the argument that the Senate's role in
appointments justified a proposal to limit senators to nonconsecutive terms; "the
Senate," he said, "had but a negative upon the President; they had only an advisory
power."2 3 3 Each of these statements by supporters of the Constitution rested on an
assumption that the President's power to nominate was exclusive and that the
Senate had no role in choosing nominees.
A review of originalist sources confirms what the text of the Constitution
makes apparent: that the President's power to nominate Supreme Court Justices is
exclusive and specifically excludes the Senate.2 3 4 The power, moreover, is not
limited to the mere formal submission of a candidate; rather, the reasons for vesting
the power in the President presuppose that the choice of nominee will be entirely
his.23 5 For reasons of presidential accountability as well as prevention of a Senate
conflict of interests, the Senate was not to participate in the actual selection of
candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court. Any effort to encroach upon the
President's exclusive power to select the individual nominees breaches the
separation of powers unless validated by past practice. Repudiation of a President's
Supreme Court nominations by way of a Senate moratorium quite arguably
constitutes such an encroachment without more. But there is more. There is
usurpation of the nomination power.

B. Usupation
In addition to repudiating presidential power, a Senate moratorium may
constitute a usurpation of the President's nomination power in violation of the
separation of powers. When the Senate imposes a moratorium on Supreme Court
230 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 134 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891)
(1788).
231

d

2 id. at 476-77 (1787).
233 Id. at 323 (1788).
232

234 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; supranotes 230-233 and accompanying text.
235 See John 0. McGinnis, Essay, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the
Conirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 635-36
(1993) (finding that the nomination power rests solely with the President and carries political weight).
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nominations until the incumbent President leaves office, the Senate is engaged in
"President-shopping."2 3 6 The Senate deliberately postpones its consideration of
nominees so as to hold a Supreme Court vacancy open until the exclusive power to
make a nomination to fill the vacancy has passed to a new President.2 3 7 There are at
least two ways in which this practice of "President-shopping" may constitute a
Senate usurpation of the nomination power. First, the Senate superintends the
selection of Supreme Court nominees by determining which President gets to
make the selection, aggrandizing to itself a major role in the exercise of the
nomination power. Second, a moratorium may usurp the President's exclusive
power to make Supreme court nominations by effectively transferring the
nomination power from the President to someone who is not the President, at least
not yet.
i. Superintending
A Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations until a different
President takes office amounts to "President-shopping" for a preferred nominator
so as to materially alter the exercise of the nomination power. This effort to
participate in the exercise of that power may impermissibly intrude upon the
President's exclusive nomination power and thus violate the separation of powers.
The idea of an extended moratorium on Supreme Court nominations is so
unusual that identifying analogies among established separation of powers
principles is difficult. There has been nothing quite like it in the preceding two
centuries.23 The superintending of another branch's exercise of an exclusive power
nevertheless does have some rough analogies. The Constitution protects the
Judicial Branch from efforts by the other two branches to superintend its exercise of
the judicial power. 239 It is settled law, for example, that the separation of powers
precludes an arrangement in which judicial determinations are made subject to
review and approval by the Executive Branch. 2 4 0 Congress also may not require
24
federal courts to find certain facts or reach certain judgments in particular cases. 1
Rather, "those who apply a rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and

23 See supra notes 33, 164 and accompanying text.

x

See supra notes 33, 164 and accompanying text.

* Of course, the very unusualness of a practice raises serious questions about its constitutional
conformity to the separation of powers; see infra notes 415-423 and accompanying text.

" See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Po,6tical
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REv. 697, 707-12 (1995) (outlining the general constitutional and policy
frameworks protecting the judiciary's independence).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 409 (1792); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 n.15 (1988) (discussing these
precedents).
241 See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1326 (2016); Robertson v. Seattle Audobon

Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992).
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interpret that rule[.]"2 4 2 The other branches may not superintend the Judiciary in
the exercise of its exclusive power to interpret and apply the law to the particular
cases or controversies before it.
The Constitution similarly protects Executive officials from congressional
efforts to superintend their exercise of executive power.2 43 Congress may not
establish a scheme of "legislative vetoes," whereby it attempts to grant itself the
unilateral power to oversee and reverse regulatory actions taken by the
Executive Branch's departments and agencies. 2" Neither may Congress grant itself
the power to supervise and remove federal officials in the exercise of
executive powers, 24 5 nor require the President to obtain the advice and
consent of the Senate before removing Executive Branch appointees.246 As the
Court observed in Bowsher v. Synar, "The Constitution does not contemplate an
active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of
the laws it enacts." 24 7
This principle against superintending raises general doubts about the
constitutionality of efforts by the Senate to superintend the President's exercise of
his exclusive power to make Supreme Court nominations. The Senate's current
Standing Rule XXXI provides for the automatic referral of a Supreme Court
nomination to the Judiciary Committee.2 48 If the Senate amended its rule to
provide for the summary rejection of any Supreme Court nominee not drawn from
a list of names supplied to the President by the Majority Leader, that rule would
likely represent an impermissible attempt by the Senate to superintend and usurp
the President's exclusive power to make Supreme Court nominations.
Although such a Senate rule might appear merely to regulate Senate procedure,
it would in fact usurp presidential power: the history of the issue in the debates at
the Constitutional Convention explains why. In vesting the nomination power in

the President, the Framers deliberately rejected an allocation of powers that would
have vested the Senate with the power both to appoint and to remove Justices of
the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Framers sought to avoid an allocation of
powers in which the Senate's trial of impeachments of sitting Justices could be
influenced by the Senate's recognition that conviction and removal of a Justice
would give the Senate itself the opportunity to fill the vacancy with a new Justice of

&

242 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
243 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation ofPowers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 599-602 (1984) (outlining the general constitutional and
policy safeguards of the Executive's independence).
2" See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 921-22 (1983).
245 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27
(1986).
246 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176
(1926).
247 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
248
S. Doc. No. 113-18, at 43-44 (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC113sdocl8/pdf/CDOC-113sdocl8.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTY5-4GTC]; DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS
MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33225, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1789

TO THE PRESENT: ACTIONS BY THE SENATE, THE JUDICIARY COMIvUTTEE, AND THE PRESIDENT

5 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33225.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AJM-8Z2H].
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its own choosing.249 The Framers' solution to that potential conflict of interest was
to remove the Senate's power to choose Supreme Court Justices. This decision
makes dear that the exclusive power of the President to make Supreme Court
nominations is not limited to the mere formal act of submitting a name to the
for
Senate
confirmation; that formality itself is constitutionally insignificant. What
matters, for constitutional purposes, is that the President, not the Senate, identify
and select individual candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court. Any
serious effort by the Senate to superintend the selection of nominees encroaches
upon a power meant to be vested solely in the President, with the specific objective
of denying the Senate any meaningful role in the actual identification and selection
of the individuals to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court.
In terms of the reason for denying the Senate any meaningful role in the
selection of Supreme Court nominees, there is, constitutionally, no material
difference between requiring the President to choose a nominee from a short list of
candidates selected by the Senate and imposing a moratorium on Supreme Court
nominations until a new President of a different party takes office. A President of
one party will typically select a Supreme Court nominee from a relatively small
universe of lower court judges and other highly qualified lawyers with legal views
compatible with his own party.250 "President-shopping" for a nominator of the
other party will typically result in the selection of a Supreme Court nominee from
an equally small but completely different universe of lower court judges and other
highly qualified lawyers with legal views compatible with the other party. 25' If the
Senate imposes a moratorium on one President to shop for a nominator from the
other party, it enables the Senate to choose for itself which of the two small
universes of highly qualified lawyers from which it will receive Supreme Court
nominations. The only real difference between this scheme and one requiring the
President to draw his nominee from a short list of Senate-provided names is the
size of the pool. Even that difference is not likely to be particularly material, as a
short list of the President would likely bear an uncanny resemblance to the short
list compiled by a Senate majority of the same party. In either case, what really
matters in terms of the effect on senatorial incentives and presidential prerogatives
is that the nominee will be drawn from one party's universe of qualified individuals
and not from the other party's universe of qualified individuals. For the typical
liberal or conservative Senator, any circuit judge or prominent practitioner drawn
from their own side of the ideological spectrum will be mostly fungible with any
249 See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text; see also Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of
Powers and the Ongins of the Appointments Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1061-64 (1987)
(reviewing the Framers' debates on the appointments clause and executive power).
20 See Robert Barnes, Justices Tend to Agree with the President That Picks Them-but Stray
Later, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_1aw/supremecourt-justices-are-loyal-to-their-presidents--they-stray-later/2015/12/20/0016886a-a5al-1le5-9c4ebe37f66848bb story.html? [https://perma.cc/P4DB-MP22].
251 See Clark, supra note 33, at 744-49.
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other. It is the ideological divide that is crucial, and that ideological divide may be
serviced about as well by "President-shopping" for a preferred nominator as by
compelling the President to choose a nominee from a Senate-compiled short list.
In either case, the Senate would be arrogating to itself a highly meaningful role
in the exercise of the nomination power. "President-shopping" would give it less
control over the individuals selected than restricting the President to a Senatecompiled short list, but it would still allow the Senate to select one of the two
ideological universes of nominees as opposed to the other. Either scheme,
moreover, would have roughly the same effect on the incentive of a Senator in
deciding whether to convict and remove a sitting Supreme Court Justice in order to
see a more ideologically compatible replacement appointed to the bench. Because
"President-shopping" for a nominator presents a version of the very evil that
prompted the Framers to deny the Senate any meaningful role in selecting
Supreme Court nominees, the conclusion follows that "President-shopping" for a
preferred nominator exceeds the Senate's authority and encroaches upon power
allocated exclusively to the President. It would violate the separation of powers
unless saved by a validating tradition.
ii. Conveyancing
In addition to superintending the nomination power, a Senate moratorium on
Supreme Court nominations may also usurp the President's nomination power in a
second way. By "President-shopping" for a more preferred nominator, the Senate is
effectively dispossessing the incumbent President of his exclusive power to make
Supreme Court nominations and transferring it to someone else, known or
unknown, who is not yet the President and lacks the present authority to exercise
the power. For convenience, this tactic may be called "conveyancing," and it
represents a differentway to conceptualize the Senate's potential usurpation of the
nomination power through "President-shopping."
The central premise is that the Constitution (as well as American political
tradition) provides for "only one [P]resident at a time;" 252 the President, Article II
dearly states, "shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years . . ."23 A
former President retains some residual authority to protect his own interests, 25 4 and
to a limited extent even those of future Presidents,2 55 but he is no longer the
President and therefore not authorized to command the executive power. Likewise,

252 Ruth Marcus, Opinion, Memo to Trump: There Can Be Only One Presidentata Time, WASH.
POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/memo-to-trump-there-can-be-only-

one-president-at-a-time/2016/12/28/753bl406-cd39-11e6-a747d03044780a02_story.html?utmterm=.5efdldcfcd42 [https://perma.cc/6T63-ZYFW].
253 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
254 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that a former President cannot be
held civilly liable for damages stemming from his official acts).
255 See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serys., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (holding that confidentiality
between the President and his advisors extends past the end of the President's term).
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a President-Elect gains some statutory protections,256 but he is not yet the
President and is not yet authorized to command the executive power-even less so
is a mere presidential hopeful or an unknown future President. The simple fact is
that "only the incumbent is charged with performance of the executive duty under
the Constitution, "257 and "it must be presumed that the incumbent President is
vitally concerned with and in the best position to assess the present and future
needs of the Executive Branch . . . ."258
The constitutional power of the President does not become subservient to the
indulgence of the Senate merely because a President's term approaches its end.
That end, which previously happened by indirect constitutional mandate on every
fourth March 4,259 has arrived quadrennially since 1940 at exactly noon on January
20 by force of the 20th Amendment. 260 An outgoing President may veto a bill or
submit a nomination until his last day in office,261 and an outgoing Vice President,
elected for the same term as the President, 262 may break a tie in the Senate on the
last day of the term. 2 63 Indeed, the outgoing Vice President presides over Congress
during the counting of electoral votes in choosing the next President and Vice
President.2 6 4 The powers of the President are not constitutionally throttled even
during the final seventeen days of his term from January 3 to January 20, when the
next Congress has already taken office but the next President, elected at the same
time as the incoming Congress, has not.2 65 Not only does the President retain his
powers to the final day of office, but he also remains bound by the duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed until the final day of his term. 2 66
There are only two constitutional ways to deprive a sitting President of his
powers before the end of his term: conviction by the Senate following
impeachment by the House 267 or determination of his inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the office. 268 In neither instance does the Senate possess the
256
257

E.g. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2012) (establishing that threatening the President is a federal crime).
Nixon v. Adm 'rofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 448.

2ss Id. at 449.
25 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 523 (Roscoe R. Hill ed.,

Gov't. Printing Office 1937) (Sept. 13, 1788) (setting "the first Wednesday in March" of 1789 as the
date "for commencing proceedings" under the Constitution); see U.S. CONST. amend. XII, amended by
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (identifying, prior to amendment, March 4 as the start date of
presidential terms).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
261 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
262 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
2 64
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
265 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
266 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
267 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (giving the House the "sole Power of Impeachment"); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (giving the Senate the "sole Power to try all Impeachments"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4
(listing actions warranting impeachment). The same applies to a person who succeeded to the
presidency or acted as president. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 1,3; U.S.
amend. XXV, §§ 1, 3-4.
CONST.
26
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3-4.

Vol. 106

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

372

unilateral power to deprive the President of his powers. The House must initiate
the impeachment process, 26 9 and the Vice President, cabinet, and House must all
participate in the declaration of a President as incapable of exercising his powers. 270
Nor does the Senate ever acquire presidential powers or unilaterally choose who
exercises them when the sitting President is removed or deemed incapable of
discharging his powers. In either instance, the powers devolve upon the Vice
President, who serves as either a new President 271 or as the Acting President, 2 7 2 or
in the absence of a Vice President, the powers devolve upon whichever official
Congress, including at least the House as well as the Senate, has designated by
law.27 3 The only unilateral role of the Senate in presidential succession is in
choosing its own President pro tempore, who, by statute,2 74 is third in line for the
presidency after the Vice President and Speaker of the House.2 75 In the absence of
removal by way of impeachment or suspension of the exercise of powers by
incapacitation, Article II mandates that a sitting President "shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years . . . ."2 7 6
Were the objective of a Senate moratorium to dispossess the incumbent
President of an exclusive executive power, such as the power to make Supreme
Court nominations, in order to transfer it to the Senate or to Congress generally,
the attempted conveyancing would violate the separation of powers. Congress may
not appropriate executive power and vest it in the Legislative Branch or one of its
officers,2 7 7 and there is no reason to suppose that the Senate may do alone what it is
forbidden to do with the agreement of the House and the signature of the
President. In a similar vein, Congress may not withdraw core judicial functions
from the Judicial Branch and transfer them to non-Article III courts. 278 Such
attempts at conveyancing usurp the power of the dispossessed branch of
government and violate the separation of powers as a result.
Although a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations until a new
President takes office is obviously different from those examples of impermissible
interbranch conveyancing, a moratorium presents functionally analogous problems.
In the case of a moratorium, the attempted conveyancing is not interbranch, but
269 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
270 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV, §§
271 U.S. CONST. amend. XX,
272 U.S. CONsT. amend. XX,

3-4.

§ 3; U.S.

§ 3; U.S.

CONST. amend. XXV,
CONST. amend. XXV,

273 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4.
274

§

§§

1.

3-4.

3 U.S.C. § 19(b) (2012).

275 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XX,

§§ 3-4; U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §
1, 3-4; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)-(b).
276 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
277 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S.
252, 274-76 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
138-39 (1976).
278 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72-74 (1982). But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
854-55 (1986) (vesting of quasi-judicial power in a non-Article III court does not violate the separation
of powers).
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intrabranch, from one President to another. But it is nevertheless an attempt at an
intertemporalconveyancing of a power from the incumbent President, who is
exclusively authorized to exercise it, to a future President, who, until a future
inauguration, has no greater constitutional authorization to exercise the exclusive
power of the incumbent President than the Congress or the Judiciary do. Indeed,
he may have less. At least the incumbent members of Congress and the sitting
27 9
The Presidentfederal Judiciary have taken oaths to support the Constitution.
Elect may never have. In that sense, the notion that the Senate may appropriate the
power to make Supreme Court nominations and hold it in trust for a future
President is less defensible than the notion that it can transfer the power to the
Majority Leader of the Senate immediately.
The different theories of impermissible encroachment provide significant
support for the proposition that a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court
nominations is a prima facie violation of the separation of powers. The key
determination of its constitutionality may be whether it is saved from invalidity by
a historical tradition that legitimizes it.28 0
III. IMPAIRMENT

Even if a moratorium on Supreme Court nominations does not exceed the
scope of the Senate's confirmation power and thereby encroach upon the Executive
Branch, it still may violate the separation of powers in the second general way. In
addition to the anti-encroachment principle, the separation of powers also imposes
281
Even when
an anti-impairment principle on the three branches of government.
acting within the scope of its allocated powers, one branch may not unduly "impair
282
A Senate moratorium on
another in the performance of its constitutional duties."
Supreme Court nominations may violate the separation of powers by impermissibly
impairing the functioning of another branch of government.
The anti-impairment principle regulates the separation of powers in areas
where the allocated powers of two branches overlap and thus may conflict with
each other.2 8 3 If one branch's exercise of its power sufficiently impairs the other
branch in the exercise of its powers, the anti-impairment principle sometimes
mandates a balancing of interests in order to resolve the conflict of powers, rather
2 84
On one
than always leaving resolution to an interbranch political confrontation.
side of the balance is the degree to which the challenged action of one branch
28 5
On the
impairs an interest that the other branch has in its own functioning.
other side is the impairing branch's justification for the impairment or, in other
279 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
280 See infra Part IV.
281
282
283

284
285

See supra notes 69, 76-81 and accompanying text.
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-83 (1989).
See id
See id. at 382-83; see aho supra notes 78, 81 and accompanying text.
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words, its interest in carrying out the challenged action.2 86 Accommodation of the
competing interests depends on the relative extent to which a branch's interests are
impaired, taking account of mitigation options that either branch could use to
minimize or avoid the impairment.2 8 7
This anti-impairment principle applies to the Senate's imposition of a
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations until the sitting President leaves
office. Such a moratorium may produce two different types of interbranch
impairments. First, it may impermissibly impair the ability of the President to
fulfill his constitutional duty to appoint Supreme Court Justices2 88 and his related
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ... ."289 Second, a Senate
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations may impermissibly impair the ability
of the Supreme Court itself to exercise "[t]he judicial Power of the United States,"
which is vested first and foremost in that institution. 290 A Senate moratorium
violates the separation of powers in either of these ways if the interest of the other
branch outweighs the Senate's interest in the moratorium, so a crucial
consideration is the Senate's interest in imposing a moratorium.

A. Executive Impairment
Existing authority identifies two major areas in which the Constitution places
limits on the power of another branch to act in ways that impermissibly impair the
functioning of the Executive Branch. The first area consists of attempts by
Congress to impose limits on the ability of the President to remove subordinate
federal officers. 2 9 ' The second area consists of the attempts by federal courts to
subject the President to judicial process.2 9 2
In the removal conflicts, the patterns are fairly similar, even if the outcomes are
not always the same. Congress seeks to promote an interest in securing the
independence of a particular executive officer, such as an independent counsel, by
protecting the officer from removal by the President without cause. 29 3 The
impairment thus results from the limitation on the President's removal power.2 94
The President resists the limitation by asserting an interest in holding subordinate
5
executive officers accountable in order to assure the faithful execution of the laws. 2 9
Where the limitations on removal protect the independence of a federal officer who
exercises quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, the congressional interest
286 See id.; see also supra notes 78 and accompanying text.
287 See id. at 380-84; see also supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
288 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[H]e ... shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court .....
289 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
290 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
291 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
292 See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
293 See, e.g. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660-64, 689-93.
294 Id. at 685, 689-90.
295 See id. at 689-90; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477,513-14 (2010).
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generally prevails. 2 9 6 Where the limitations protect the independence of a federal
officer who exercises purely executive power, the presidential interest prevails and
the limitation is invalid if it leaves the President with no effective means of
controlling the officer, 2 97 but the congressional interest prevails if the limitation
leaves the President with some effective alternative means of controlling the officer,
even if indirectly. 298
In the judicial process conflicts, the patterns are also fairly consistent. The
Judiciary seeks to do justice by adjudicating a controversy in which the President is
a defendant or at least by subjecting him to compulsory process in order to obtain
material evidence for an adjudication. 2 9 9 The impairment results from the
subjection of the President to some form of legal process, which he resists on the
ground either that participating in litigation as a defendant will intrude upon his
scarce time or that disclosing the evidence will chill his subordinates from
providing him with candid advice."* Where the litigation, if properly managed by
the trial court, would not pose a risk of serious distraction, the judicial interest
prevails.3 o' In the attempts to obtain evidence, the result of the assertion of
executive privilege depends on a fact-specific weighing of the magnitude of the
need, the severity of the intrusion, and the viability of mitigation.3 0 2
In a conflict over a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations, the
impairment may seem obvious, but it is a bit more complicated than it appears.
Certainly, the President has a constitutional duty both to appoint Supreme Court
Justices when vacancies happen03 and also to assure the faithful execution of the
laws,30 4 including the execution of the statute fixing the membership of the
Supreme Court at nine seats.3 os But the President's appointment power is explicitly
constrained by the requirement of Senate consent to any appointment. 3 06 In
general, the Senate's discretion to confirm or reject a nominee is as unfettered as
the President's discretion to sign or veto a bill, which is a somewhat analogous
condition on Congress's exercise of its legislative power. Because the Senate has the
prerogative to thoroughly vet a nominee and reject an unsuitable one or even a
succession of unsuitable ones, 3 0 identifying the impairment that results from a
296 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).

See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495-97, 513-14.
298 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-96 (1988).
299 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 704-06
(1997).
297

" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-57 (1982).
301

Chnton, 520 U.S. at 703-06; Nixon v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 753-58.

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 389-90 (2004); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 444 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974).
303 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
304 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
30s 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
06 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
302

307 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 9-18

(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 5th ed. 2008) (1921) (chronicling the successive rejections of
two Nixon nominations).
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moratorium is not necessarily as simple as pointing to the unfilled vacancy on the
Court and concluding that the Senate has forced the President to violate his
appointment and faithful-execution duties. Still, part of the identification of the
impairment surely must start with a recognition that the President has a duty to
make appointments when vacancies happen so as to assure the faithful execution of
the judicial statute and that the Senate moratorium precludes his fulfiling these
duties.
Perhaps the best way to account for the Senate's unfettered discretion to vet
and reject nominees is to recognize that, in the specific case of a moratorium, the
Senate is not exercising its discretion at all; it is forsaking it. A Senate moratorium
on Supreme Court nominations until a different President takes office is not
preventing the appointment of new Justices because the Senate is thoroughly
vetting nominees and rejecting unsuitable ones. Rather, the Senate is refusing to do
anything at all. The law acknowledges a difference between hard bargaining and a
refusal to bargain at all.30 s A true moratorium is the latter. In that case, the
existence and continuation of the vacancy assumes greater weight in identifying the
impairment of the President's power than might be true in the case of vigorous
opposition to particular nominees. The extension of the vacancy in the case of a
moratorium is a product of calculated disengagement by the Senate. The difference
ought to have constitutional significance in the identification of an impairment, as
the conflict exists because of one branch's boycott of a constitutional process in
which it has an essential role.
In that situation, it would not be unfair to the Senate to identify the
impairment of the President's power as commencing at the moment the
moratorium is imposed. The impact on his ability to fulfill his constitutional
obligations begins almost immediately. Every week of a continuing moratorium
threatens to delay any potential confirmation process by another week and
postpones by a week the time when the President will be able to discharge his
constitutional duties by appointing a confirmed nominee to the Supreme Court.
The Senate's moratorium during the Scalia vacancy does not represent the
outer limit of possibilities if the imposition of a moratorium is accepted as
constitutional. When analyzing a separation of powers question, one may consider
the expansion of a practice, "if allowed to stand."' 09 If the Senate may impose a
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations during the final year of a presidency,
there would be no apparent reason why it could not impose one during the final
two years, for an entire term, or until some future time when an acceptable
President is elected. Likewise, if the Senate may impose a moratorium while one
Supreme Court vacancy exists, there would be no apparent reason why it could not
continue the moratorium even when a second or third vacancy occurs. If the Senate
still continued its moratorium, the Court would eventually lose its quorum5 o and
30s Cf29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to
bargain with its employees' chosen representative).
309 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
497 (2010).
310 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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thus the authority to act.' when a fourth vacancy occurred.312 The practice could
effectively abolish the Court by way of an extended moratorium on nominations.
Even with a second or third vacancy, the Court would likely face a significant
reduction in either its productivity or the quality of its work."' The President could
face something of a judicial emergency with a vacancy-riddled Supreme Court.
Still, a constitutionally material impairment of another branch's ability to
perform its constitutional duties does not exist if the affected branch has an
alternative way to carry out its duties. In the case of a Senate moratorium, however,
the President will likely have few, if any, mitigating options.
The most obvious alternative that the Constitution provides would be for the
President to make unilateral recess appointments to the Court,314 but this
alternative has two major limitations. First, it is unlikely even to be available to the
President. A Senate that has imposed a moratorium on Supreme Court
nominations by the incumbent President will almost certainly exploit the Courtapproved option of holding brief pro forma sessions every few days in order to
avoid recessing for a long enough time to trigger the President's recess appointment
1
power.31s The Senate exercised that option during the Scalia moratorium.
311 The Court itself has sharply limited the ability of agencies to evade statutory quorum
requirements. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88 (2010) (holding that the
statute required that quorum be met before the board could act). So, the Court may face the same
constraints itself. Indeed, the text of the Court's quorum statute is less flexible than the one at issue
there.
312 C/ Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497 (hypothesizing "a Matryoshka doll" of multiple layers of
good-cause tenure protection).
313 Whether these or other impacts on the practical operation of the Court would violate separation
of powers by impairing the ability of the Court to perform its constitutional role is a question addressed
below. See infra Section III.B.
31 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
31s See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014); id at 2568-70 (conceding that pro
forma sessions may have undesirable consequences preventing the president from making any recess
appointments).
316 The Senate met in pro forna sessions every three days during the three breaks that otherwise
were long enough to trigger the President's recess appointment power: (1) The traditional, month-long
August
recess,
see
The
August
Recess,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/NewsAugust_Recess.htm
[https://perma.cc/XH36-738X] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018); see also 162 CONG. REC. S5205 (daily ed.
July 29, 2016); id. at S5207 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2016); id. at S5209 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2016); id. at S5211
(daily ed. Aug. 9, 2016); id. at S5213 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 2016); id. at S5215 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 2016);
id. at S5217 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 2016); id. at S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 2016); id. at S5221 (daily ed.
Aug. 26, 2016); id. at S5223 (daily ed. Aug. 30, 2016); id. at S5225 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 2016); (2) The
recess around the fall election, see, e.g., 2017 CongressionalCalendar:115th Congress, FirstSession,
http://thehill.com/sites/default/files/2017 thehill-congressional-calendar.pdf
HILL,
[https://perma.cc/RT4Z-JVQV] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018); see also 162 CONG. REc. S6295 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 2016); id at S6297 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 2016); id. at S6299 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2016); id at
S6301 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2016); id. at S6303 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2016); id at S6307 (daily ed. Oct. 31,
2016); id. at S6309 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 2016); id. at S6311 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2016); id. at S6313 (daily ed.
Nov. 10, 2016); id. at S6315 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2016); id. at S6499 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2016); id. at
S6501 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2016); id at S6503 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2016); id at S6505-20 (daily ed. Nov.
28, 2016); and (3) The recess over the year-end holidays, see 2017 Congressional Calendar- 115th
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Second, the recess appointment option is not an adequate substitute for permanent
appointments to the Supreme Court. While temporary appointments may suffice
in the operation of the Executive Branch, judicial recess appointments raise serious
concerns-perhaps even constitutional ones-because of their potential to impair
judicial independence by leaving a judge's long-term continuance in office
dependent on further action by the President and Senate. 17 If a Senate moratorium
on Supreme Court nominations impairs the President's ability to exercise the
appointment power and filfill his duty to assure the faithful execution of the laws,
the theoretical availability of recess appointments does not sufficiently mitigate the
impairment in order to conclude that no separation of powers analysis is necessary.
Another alternative would be to exercise the nomination power differently.
The President could withdraw a controversial nominee and submit a lesscontroversial nominee in hopes of securing Senate action. That response, however,
works only if the Senate objects to the particular nominee. In the case of a Senate
moratorium on any Supreme Court nomination by the incumbent President, it is
not the nominee, but the President to whom the Senate objects. The Scalia
moratorium was imposed before the President selected any nominee at all, 18 and
when word surfaced that the President might nominate a popular, moderately
conservative Republican governor for the vacancy, the Senate made dear that the
moratorium applied irrespective of the identity of the nominee.1 9 When President
Obama eventually defied his own political base and nominated Judge Garland, a
non-diverse choice widely viewed as a moderate Democrat but one of exceptional
qualification, the Senate went out of its way to disclaim any negative assessment of
Garland himself.3 0 When the President faces a true moratorium on any Supreme
Court nomination he makes, his option to withdraw one nominee and submit
another makes little difference.
Of course, the President might try just giving the Senate what it wants. While
the Senate disclaimed a specific objection to Garland, the Republican majority was
widely viewed as imposing the moratorium in hopes of securing a principled
conservative nominee if a Republican won the upcoming presidential election. The
Congress, First Session, supr, see also 162 CONG. REC. S7169 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2016); id at S7171
(daily ed. Dec. 16, 2016); id at S7173 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2016); id at S7175 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2016);
id. at S7177 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2016); id. at S7179 (Dec. 30, 2016).
317 See, e.g., Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-Constitutional
but Unwise?, 10 STAN.
L. REV. 124 (1957) (suggesting that judicial recess appointments may impair judicial independence).
31 See Chris Wilson, Antonin Scalas Open Supreme Court Seat Could Set Record for Vacancy,
14,
2016),
http://time.com/4224348/scalia-vacancy-supreme-court/
TIME
(Feb.
[https://perma.cc/R6BV-8SNJ.
3
See Mark Sherman & Mary Clare Jalonick, Garland Submits Questionnaire as Judiciary
(May
10,
2016,
1:16
PM),
Stonew1s,
PBS
NEwSHOuR
Committee
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/nndown/garland-submits-questionnaire-as-judiciary-committeestonewalls/ [https://perma.cc/EZW6-PGTG].
320 See Emmarie Huetteman, Merrick GarlandCompletes Nominee Questionnairefor the Senate,
https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first(May
10,
2016,
5:47
PM),
N.Y.
TIMES
draft/2016/05/10/merrick-garland-completes-nominee-questionnaire-for-the-senate/?mcubz=1&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/43EE-WTC4].
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political realities suggest that the President might have persuaded the Senate to end
its moratorium by capitulating to their ideological preference and nominating a
principled conservative.3 2 1 If the President faced a true judicial emergency, he could
choose that alternative, however personally repellent or politically damaging it
might be.
Still, there are at least three problems with the President choosing a Supreme
Court nominee to appease the Senate's ideological interests. First, for reasons
described earlier, 3 2 2 it arguably just mitigates an impairment of the President's
appointment power by impermissibly misallocating the nomination power. The
Constitution presupposes that the choice of nominees belongs exclusively to the
President, not to the Senate.3 23 Substituting one violation of the separation of
powers for another is hardly a solution. Second, even if the Senate is covertly
motivated by ideology, taking action on even an ideologically acceptable nominee
may be politically impossible once the Senate has offered some politically neutral
pretext for the moratorium. In the Garland episode, the popular mandate rationale
for the moratorium logically precluded any alternative that involved considering
32 4
The need to maintain the
any nominee submitted by the outgoing President.
public rationale for the moratorium compelled the Majority Leader to reject calls
from within his own party for confirming Garland in the lame duck period after
325
Now, there is
the election if the Democratic candidate won the presidency.
certainly no rule against a Senate leader changing his mind and appearing
inconsistent or even hypocritical, but firmly grounding a moratorium in some
neutral public rationale, such as the desire to allow voters to choose the President
who will fill the vacancy, may make it politically quite difficult to relent later merely
because the incumbent President submits a new nominee who meets with
ideological approval. A moratorium imposes political obstacles that the mere
objection to a particular nominee does not. A final problem with this alternative is
simply that the answer to a separation of powers question, such as the
constitutionality of a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations by an
incumbent President, should not turn on whether the President is on good or bad
terms with the Senate and does or does not acquiesce in its potential violation of
3 26
the separation of powers.

321 See Sherman &Jalonick, supra note 319.
322 See supraPart II.
323 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
324 See Sherman &Jalonick, supra note 319.
325 See Ted Barrett, GOP Leaders Ignore Trump-InspiredCalls to Confirm GarlandNow, CNN

POL. (May 5, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/05/politics/merrick-garland-supremecourt-donald-trump/index.html [https:/perma.cc/P3DU-L2EX].
326

Cf Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010) ("[T]he

separated powers of our Government cannot be permitted to turn on judicial assessment of whether an
officer exercising executive power is on good terms with Congress." (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478

U.S. 714, 730 (1986))).
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B. JudicialImpainnent
In addition to potentially impairing the President's ability to fulfill his
constitutional obligations, a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations
may also impair the Supreme Court's ability to perform its constitutional functions.
In applying the anti-impairment principle to impacts on the Judiciary, the central
question is whether the action of one branch "threatens the institutional integrity of
the Judicial Branch." 3 27 Impermissible threats can be tangible, such as disrupting
the actual operation of the Judicial Branch, or intangible, particularly by
"undermin[ing] public confidence in the disinterestedness of the Judicial
Branch."3 28 A Senate attempt to pack the Court by "President-shopping"
potentially poses both sorts of dangers, although the threat to public confidence is
the more serious one.
i. Tangible Effects
A Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations arguably might disrupt
the operation of the Court in several tangible ways. In the situation most likely to
violate the separation of powers, a lengthy, multi-year moratorium leaving several
unfilled vacancies could severely impair the operation of the Court by depriving it
of the requisite quorum to operate lawfully.3 2 9 Less extreme moratoriums could still
impermissibly impair the Court's tangible operation in less obvious ways by
saddling it with an even number of Justices, which leaves them vulnerable to
deadlock, or by materially diminishing the Court's overall productivity because it is
statutorily short-handed.330 Whether the latter situations would violate the
separation of powers is a tougher question.
1. Denial of a Quorum
Notwithstanding the view of one defender of a Senate moratorium that "the
Senate is fully within its powers to let the Supreme Court die out, literally,"'
allowing the membership of the Court to decline to the point where it lost its
statutory quorum and thus its ability to operate would impose a severe impairment
on the Court and trigger a grave separation of powers question. By statute, six
332
If the
Justices are necessary to give the Supreme Court a quorum to operate.
Senate vowed to ignore any Supreme Court nomination made by an incoming
President, the fourth vacancy to arise during that President's tenure would deprive
327 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
328 See id. at 406-07.
329 See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).

330 See id.
331
332

See Shapiro, supra note 23.
28 U.S.C. § 1.

20r7-2018

Senators Can't Be Choosers

381

the Court of a quorum to operate at all. While four vacancies during a presidency
seems like an unusually large number, it has not been uncommon until the past few
decades. President Nixon filled four vacancies during his time as President and
would have had a chance to fill a fifth one had his Watergate crimes not forced his
resignation before Justice Douglas's retirement in 1975."' Five vacancies arose
during Eisenhower's two terms and four during Truman's two terms.3 34 Likewise,
five vacancies arose during Franklin Roosevelt's second term alone..s and six during
Taft's one term. 6 There were thus five instances during the 20th century when a
Senate vow to ignore any nomination made by the incumbent President during his
time in office could have eventually left the Court without a quorum to operate.
That course of behavior is exactly what some advocated if Hillary Clinton had won
the 2016 presidential election.3 3 1
Ensuring the existence of a functioning Supreme Court appears to be a matter
of constitutional obligation, not congressional discretion. While the creation of
lower federal courts may be discretionary, Article IHI does not provide that the
338
It provides that
federal judicial power may be vested in the Supreme Court.
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court . . . ."" As Justice Story observed in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, "It is
3
manifest that a supreme court must be established" by Congress. " He explained:
[T]he object of the constitution was to establish three great
departments of government; the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial departments. The first was to pass laws, the second to approve
and execute them, and the third to expound and enforce them.
Without the latter, it would be impossible to carry into effect some of
the express provisions of the constitution.34 1
The Supreme Court of the United States is a uniquely vulnerable part of the
system of government established by the Constitution. Unlike Congress or the
342
President, the Court is wholly dependent on the other branches for its existence.
The Constitution presupposes a Chief Justice and presumably at least one associate

See RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 36-37.
334 See id. at 34-35.
3

33s See id. at 33.
336 See id. at 30.
331

See Shapiro, supra note 23.

338 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3
340

Id. (emphasis added).
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,330 (1816).

341 Id. at 329.
342 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2, cl. 2 (providing for presidential authority to nominate Justices
by "[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Senate"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("[V]est[ing] [judicial power] in
one supreme Court, and . . . such inferior Courts as the Congress may. .. ordain and establish."); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction subject to congressional
regulation).
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34 3
but the Constitution does not even prescribe the number of justices that
the Supreme Court should have.3" By lawmaking, Congress and the President
have had to fix the size of the Court and also prescribe the time for its convening.34 5
Nowhere does the Constitution literally require Congress and the President to
establish the Supreme Court, but if the Court is a mandatory element of the
constitutional system, the actions necessary to establish it must be constitutional
obligations. By extension, the actions necessary to maintain the Court in operation
must be constitutional obligations as well. As the Court lacks any mechanism for
perpetuating itself, as in choosing its own new members, these obligations of
creation and maintenance necessarily lie with the President and the Senate.

justice,

2. Risk of Deadlock
By law, a filly-staffed Supreme Court consists of nine Justices. 3 4 The benefit
of an odd number such as nine is that it significantly reduces the risk of deadlock.
Isolated recusals may still result in an inability to act because of an equal division of
participating Justices, but the prospects are much lower from isolated recusals on a
Court with an odd number of Justices than from the ordinary participation of all
Justices on a court with an even number of members. It did not escape notice that
the Court's ability to perform its constitutional function was somewhat impaired by
deadlocks during the 14-month Scalia vacancy.3 47 The burdens resulting from an
even number of Justices over a longer period could materially diminish the role of
the Court within the Judicial Branch and in the broader federal system.
Concluding that any impairment from this cause would violate the separation of
powers remains difficult, however, because of historical precedent.
It is difficult to conclude that a moratorium that leaves the Court with an even
number of Justices violates the separation of powers because it requires accepting
the proposition that the First Congress and President acted unconstitutionally
when they established the Supreme Court in 1789.348 It may be hard today to
conceive of a Court with any number of seats other than the nine it has had since
1869,349 but nothing in the text of the Constitution sets the size of the Court at
nine members, and nine is not the number that the First Congress and President
chose when they adopted the Judiciary Act of 1789. They created a Supreme Court

343 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing the only instance where the Chief Justice is
mentioned in the Constitution); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing the procedure for nominating

justices).
34 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
345 See, e.g., supraSection I.B.ii.

346 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
347 See Ariane de Vogue, Scalia to Gorsuch: What a Long Strange Trp It' Been, CNN POL. (Apr.
7,
2017,
12:20
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/politics/scalia-gorsuch-long-strangetrip/index.html [https://perma.cc/4FXR-VPKZ].
348 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (creating a six-Justice Supreme Court).
349 Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
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with six seats, an even number,so and but for a repudiated effort to reduce the
number to five in 1801,35' the Court remained at six members until 1807, when
Congress added a seventh seat and finally gave the Court an odd number of
members. 3s 2 When Congress added two more seats in 1837 the size of the Court
grew to nine but remained an odd number. 3 3
The only departure from the nine-member standard after 1837 came during
the 1860s and was short-lived. In 1863, Congress added a tenth judicial circuit for
California and Oregon and a tenth Supreme Court Justice to go with it.3 54 The
addition once again returned the Court to an even number of seats, but Congress
reduced the Court to seven members by attrition in 1866.15 In 1869, after the
Court had dropped by attrition to eight members,35 6 Congress then fixed the Court
at nine members, where it has remained.3 s7 President Franklin Roosevelt's
infamous Court-packing plan of 1937 would also have allowed the President to
increase the membership of the Court by adding up to six new members, a power
which he could have exercised, had the scheme been enacted, to give the Court an
even number of seats. 35 8
Even though there is very little endorsement of an even number of Justices
after 1807, the actions of the First Congress are weighty. Since they chose to create
a Court with an even number of Justices, it is extremely difficult to maintain the
constitutional invalidity of a Senate moratorium based on a potential for deadlocks
because vacancies have reduced the Court to an even number of Justices. Like
recess appointments to the Court, having a Court with an even number ofJustices
may be unwise but not unconstitutional.
3. Other Tangible Impairments
It is certainly possible that the operation of the Court would be impaired by a
vacancy-perpetuating moratorium in other tangible ways. Anything short of the full
statutory complement of Justices would seemingly increase the workload or reduce
the productivity of the Court below the implicit statutory expectation. Such

"so Judiciary Act of 1789 § 1.
`s The outgoing Federalists passed a law in 1801 that reduced the Court to five seats by attrition,
Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89, but the law was repealed before any vacancy arose, Act of
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132 (effective July 1, 1802).
352 Seventh Circuit Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421.
3ss Eighth and Ninth Circuits Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176,
176.
354 Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794.
3s Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209.
356 JOSEPH M. BESSETTE & JOHN J. PITNEY, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS:
DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND CITIZENSHIP 463 (Carolyn Merrill et al. eds., Wadsworth
Cengage Learning 2d ed. 2014) (2012).
3s7 Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44; see also BESSETTE & PITNEY, supra
note 356, at 463.
1ss S. REP. No. 75-711 (1937), as repintedinDOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 562 (Henry
Steele Commager ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 4th ed. 1948) (1934).
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practical effects are relevant in an impairment analysis.s' Still, the impairment
must be substantial, and this one may be hard to quantify.
ii. Intangible Effects
The gravest impairment that a Senate moratorium is likely to inflict on the
Court is the intangible impact on its legitimacy. The political branches have a
separation of powers duty to avoid impairing the integrity of the Judicial Branch by
"undermin[ing] public confidence in [its] disinterestedness ... . 6 o The Court has
expressed particular alarm at the prospect that the actions of the other branches
could give the Court the public appearance of partisanship. 61
A Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations until a new President
takes office may often produce this intangible but pernicious effect by creating the
public impression that Supreme Court nominees are the mere partisan plants of
their ideological champions. Legitimacy, almost by default, is essential for the
Judiciary to perform its constitutional function and maintain its co-equal status
among the three branches of government. With "no influence over either the sword
or the purse," Alexander Hamilton wrote in FederastNo.78, the federal judiciary
has "neither force nor wil, but merely judgment[.] 3 6 2 As a consequence, its real
power flows from its legitimacy-the public's "acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to
determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.' 63 It is a
public acquiescence that can be fragile. "[A] product of substance and
perception, '064 judicial legitimacy "ultimately depends on [the Court's] reputation
for impartiality and nonpartisanship." 6 s Judges must take pains to separate their
judgment from politics. To maintain legitimacy, they must render decisions that
are genuinely principled and, even more importantly, "perceived as such."3 66 While
recusal and other methods exist to manage actual bias, "no such mechanism can
overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary
involvement in the making of policy.' 67 It is for this reason that conservative
Justices have repeatedly warned in substantive due process cases that "[t]he Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution." 6 It is also why liberal Justices criticized the majority for
.. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 406-07 (1989).
360 Id. at 407.
361 See id at 407-08.
362 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 224, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion).
363 Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
3
64Id.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 866.
367 Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 407.
36' Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (paraphrasing Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)), overruledbyLawrencev. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
365
36
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terminating the vote recount in Florida and calling the 2000 election for President
Bush.369 Notwithstanding divergent applications of the idea, most acknowledge
that the Court undermines its authority if it appears to act as a "naked power
organ."370 At stake is the proposition that the Judicial Branch operates by the "rule
of law, not men, "371 which is why a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court
nominees is so problematic.
In late 2016, when it had become apparent that President Obama's nomination
of Judge Garland would expire without Senate action and that the vacancy created
by Justice Scalia's death would be held open to be filled by Obama's successor from
the opposing party, the New York Times ran a staff editorial starkly entitled, "The
Stolen Supreme Court Seat."3 72 In it, the editorial board reflected the opinion of
many people in observing that "[t]he person who gets confirmed [to replace Scalia]
will sit in a stolen seat ... It was stolen by top Senate Republicans, who ...
refused to consider any nominee Mr. Obama might send them, because they
wanted to preserve the court's conservative majority."3 7 1 In truth, this assessment of
the Senate's motive-setting aside the editorial board's condemnation of it-is
understood by many conservatives as well. Although many may have recited
ideologically neutral talking points about popular mandates, few were naive enough
to believe that those talking points described the actual motive behind the
McConnell moratorium.3 74 Even if incorrect, the widespread public perception was

see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Moore);
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 106 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore); Casey,
505 U.S. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 125 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Hardwick); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (citing Moore).
1 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
370 Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPinciples of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 12
(1959).
371 David E. Anderson, Refections on the Supreme Court, Constitutionalism,and the Rhetoric of
Law, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 75, 76 (1989); see aloJohn Adams, Novanglus: or, a History ofthe
Dispute with America, from Its Ongin, in 1754, to the Present Time, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 106 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2102/Adams_1431-04_Bk.pdf
(1774),
1851)
Brown
[https:/perma.cc/JB6D-SENA].
3n Editorial Board, Editorial, The Stolen Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/opinion/sunday/the-stolen-supreme-court-seat.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZYY-Y8U3].
374 See Lauren Carroll, Mitch McConnellExaggerates'Tradition'ofNotConfirmingElection Year
Supreme
Court
Nominees,
POLITIFACT
(Mar.
22,
2016,
4:47
PM),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/mar/22/mitch-mcconnell/mitch-mcconnellexaggerates-tradition-not-confirmi/ [https://perma.cc/98WS-NL4R]; Jay Michaelson, It's Not Just
Merrick Garland:RepubbcansAre Blocking So Many Nominees It' [sic] CausedajudicialEmergency,
DAILY BEAST (May 16, 2016, 1:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/nra-usually-shuts-upafter-mass-shootings-not-this-time?ref=scroll [https://perma.cc/7QAD-4WZD].
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that the Senate was running out the dock in hopes of getting a conservative
nominee from the next President, instead of a liberal one from the incumbent.37 s
Mistretta v. United States,"7 may be the closest authority for assessing this
concern. Against a separation of powers challenge, the Court there upheld the
intermixing of federal judges and non-judges as members of the United States
Sentencing Commission. 7 7 The challengers argued, among other things, that
having federal judges serve alongside non-judges on a policymaking board would
impair the integrity of the judiciary by assigning the judges a political role. 78 The
Court acknowledged some concern about the claim "that the Judiciary's
entanglement in the political work of the Commission undermines public
confidence in the disinterestedness of the Judicial Branch.' 7 ' The issue was not so
much any actual bias of the particular judges, but "the appearance of institutional
partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement in the making of policy."" The
Court recognized that "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends
on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship." ' With admitted doubts,
the Court rejected the claim that the participation of federal judges in the work of
the Commission would "threaten, either in fact or in appearance, the impartiality of
the Judicial Branch,"382 but the Court's rationale in dismissing the concern was
limited to the particular context.383 The work of the Commission lay at "the heart
4
judicial participation brought "judicial
of the judicial function" 38 -sentencing-so
experience and expertise"s to the "essentially neutral endeavor"3 8 6 of formulating
rules for the exclusive use of federal judges in sentencing. The Commission's work
did not touch on legislative or executive concerns within the purview of the
political branches. 8 It was not an attempt to co-opt the Judiciary's reputation for
impartiality for an endeavor that was "inherently partisan."388
In contrast, the perils of a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations
until a preferred nominator takes office are stark and difficult to manage. Put
simply, parties who lose a case because of a 5-4 decision can readily surmise, or at
least strongly suspect or reasonably believe, that the outcome would have been
3 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 374; Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, As Obama's Nominees
Langwsh in GOP Senate, Thimp to Inherit More Than 100 Court Vacancies, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 25,
2016,
10:34
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-courtvacancies-20161225-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z2SP-DQU2].
376 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
37n Id. at 384.
378id

Id. at 407.
i
381 id.
3
380
382

3

See id. at 407-08.

384 Id. at 408.
385
86
387

id.
Id at 407.
See id at 407-08.

3"8 Id. at 408.
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different had one or more of those Justices not been the product of a lengthy
moratorium designed to shift the opportunity for nomination and appointment
from a President of one ideological stripe to a President of another."' If one or
more sitting Justices truly are ideological plants in that sense, it may severely impair
the legitimacy of the Court and its work. Imagine a decision next year in which a
5-4 majority overruled Roe v. Wadd'o and de-constitutionalized the right to
abortion. Why should any woman or any supporter of abortion rights pretend that
the outcome is not directly traceable, as a matter of but-for, foreseeable, and
intentional causation, to the McConnell moratorium, which resulted in the
substitution of Justice Neil Gorsuch in place of Judge Garland on the Supreme
Court? While it is true that the Senate might not have confirmed Garland even in
the absence of a moratorium, the Senate's failure to reject the nomination outright
makes that possibility forever a subject of counterfactual speculation. The fear that
public vetting would compel enough Republican Senators to support confirmation
that he would be approved was the very reason why conservative activists demanded
the moratorium in the first place. In any event, counterfactual speculation is
unlikely to be sufficient to cleanse a widespread perception that the Senate's
behavior was designed to pack the Court, including with the specific goal of
eliminating abortion rights, and that it succeeded in doing so.
C. SenateJustications
If a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations does produce a
constitutionally sufficient impairment on either the ability of the President or the
Supreme Court to function, the moratorium likely will lack an adequate
justification to outweigh the impact on the other branch. The simple truth is that
the Senate has little real justification for an extended moratorium on vetting and
considering Supreme Court nominations, and whatever its interest may be, the
Senate has an obvious mitigation option: vetting nominees and voting to reject
them.
Some of the Senate's possible rationales might be sufficient to justify a limited
moratorium. Simply not having enough time left in a session to undertake an
adequate confirmation process is surely a weighty justification for postponing the
process to the next session. A desire to avoid the appearance of abuse of power by
confirming a nomination made by a President during the ten-week "lame duck"
period following an election that produced a new President-Elect also seems a
legitimate and significant rationale for suspending nominations and confirmations
after an incumbent-repudiating election. A desire to avoid a confirmation process

. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Sony, Neil Gorsuch. The Supreme Court Vacancy Was Already Filled,
http://time.com/4656196/scotus-neil-gorsuch-geoffrey-stone/
1,
2017),
(Feb.
TiME
[https://perma.cc/W4PE-A6JE].
390 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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during an election season might justify a moratorium from the summer to the fall
of an election year, as then-Senator Joe Biden once proposed."'
Other rationales or motives, however, are either insubstantial or altogether
illegitimate. The mere inefficiency of having to vet and consider nominees that the
Senate may ultimately reject on partisan or ideological grounds is not sufficient.
That a practice otherwise violating the separation of powers is efficient has never
been a sufficient justification for sustaining the violation.392 In any event, the
separation of powers may not require a floor debate and vote of the full Senate.
Vetting a nominee and rejecting the nomination in committee might be an
acceptable accommodation of the conflicting interests of the President and the
Senate. On the other hand, the mere desire to preserve a vacancy in hopes of
winning an impending election may have some historical precedent-which may be
enough to save it from invaliditym'-but might not even qualify as constitutionally
legitimate. Certainly, it is difficult to defend the proposition that a Constitution
which takes no partisan or ideological sides contemplates ideological court-packing
as sufficient justification for seriously impairing the functioning of either the Court
or the President.
It may even be the case that the Senate itself is severely constrained in trying to
justify a moratorium of more than a nominal length. In performing its advice and
consent function, the Senate may be under the same constitutional duty as the
President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."394 The Senate has an
"interest" in seeing that the President faithfully executes the laws that it helped to
enact,39 s but does it also sometimes share that "most important constitutional
duty"396 of the Chief Executive? Although Article II expressly imposes that duty
only on the President,397 the duty may extend implicitly to the Senate insofar as
Article II gives the Senate a role in the exercise of an executive power.9
The extension of a constitutional duty from its explicit subject to an unnamed
counterpart is hardly unprecedented. 99 By rough analogy, constitutional duties that
'9' Clark, supranote 33, at 750-54.
392 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
944 (1983)).
311 See ifda Part IV.

394 U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 3.

See David M. Driesen, Fiing US. Attomeys:An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707,715 (2008).
396 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
39s

Id.; see alsoU.S. CONST. art. H, § 3.
Cf TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43708, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND
EXEcUTIVE DISCRETION
IN THE
ENFORCEMENT
OF LAW 3-5
(Sept. 4, 2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43708.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFM4-L2UL]; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 n.21 (1994) ("[T]he Take
Care Clause empower[s] the President to exercise control over subordinates, at least so far as those
subordinates exercise 'purely executive power.'"); id. at 10 (suggesting that those exercising executive
power's would be subject to the President's duty "that the Laws be faithfully executed"); see alsoJack M.
Beermann, An Inductive UnderstandingofSeparation ofPowers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 499-505
(2011) (detailing the overlap of powers between branches and arguing for power sharing).
" See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, "We the People," ConstitutionalAccountabilty,and Outsourcing
3

398

Government, 88 IND. LJ. 1347 (2013).
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are explicitly imposed only on the government, for example, sometimes extend to
private actors by way of exceptions to the state action doctrine. When private actors
perform public functions4W or their conduct is entangleds' or entwined40 2 with
state action, the constitutional duties of government attach to the private actors.03
The situations are exceptional, but the principle exists.
Akin to the circumstance of a private actor performing a public function, the
Senate, a non-executive actor, performs an executive function when it participates
in the appointment process. 404 The Framers understood the Senate's role to be an
exercise of executive power."0 s Indeed, the function is prescribed in Article II,
which vests executive power.06 Since the First Congress, the Senate itself has
segregated its "executive" sessions, functions, and journal from its legislative
When constitutionally charged with participating in an executive
proceedings.
action, the Senate should also be deemed constitutionally bound by the duty that
governs executive action: taking care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Similarly akin to the entanglement of private conduct with state action, the
Senate's participation in the appointment process blends its conduct with
presidential action. "0' The advice and consent function does not appear as a
freestanding power. It vests literally by way of an adverbial adjunct to the grant of
' See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
4
See, eg., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
402 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-97
(2001).
4 See, e.g. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8, 14-18.
04 Cf BowSher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that participation in the process of
removing federal officials constitutes participation in the execution of the laws); id ("To permit the
execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms,
reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws.").
405 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66-67 (Max Farrand ed.,

Yale Univ. Press 1911) (June 1, 1787) (noting the observation of James Madison that the grant of
executive power alone might be sufficient to vest the appointment power but that the separate
specification of the appointment power "might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions"); 2 id. at
537 (Sept. 7, 1787) (noting George Mason's proposal to transfer most of the confirmation function
from the Senate to a privy council in the executive branch to exclude the legislative branch from an
executive power, while retaining Senate ratification of treaties on the theory that making treaties was
sufficiently legislative to justify involving the legislative branch).
406 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
40
See
The
Senate
in
Executive
Session,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Feature-HomepageExecutiveSessions.
htm [https://perma.cc/8T2W-RKZG] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
" See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (defining executive functions); see also
supranote 398 and accompanying text.
49 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (June 5, 1787) (statement by James Wilson) (opposing the Senate's role in the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices); James E. Gauch, The Intended Role ofthe Senate in Supreme
CourtAppointments,56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 351 (1989).
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the appointment power to the President, who, "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . ."410 Appointment is a power to be
exercised by the President with the Senate. 41 1 It may be understood as one power
vested in two actors, each having a distinct role. Its exercise requires the
concurrence of both actors, no less than if the Framers had opted for a plural
executive, which is, in effect, what they did in this instance. When, thus,
constitutionally charged to partake in the President's exercise of the appointment
power, the Senate should be deemed constitutionally subjected to the same duty
that constrains the President's exercise of it.
To be dear, this duty is the constitutional duty to "take Care that the laws be
faithfully executed[J" 4 12 It is not a duty to conflim the President's nominations.
Whether that sort of duty exists is a separate question.413 Rather, it is a duty to
perform its function in such a way as to assure that the laws are faithfully executed.
In other words, it is a duty to take care that the Senate's own participation in the
appointment process not impair the faithful execution of the laws. It is hard to
imagine a dearer breach of a duty than a proclamation that one is boycotting the
duty.
Without an extension of the duty, the Constitution would empower the Senate
to both frustrate the President's ability to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed and undermine the execution of the laws themselves. In the ordinary case,
the President can assure the faithful execution of the laws by supervising and
controlling federal officers who exercise purely executive power.414 Lacking such
command over the Senate, the President could no longer assure the faithful
execution of laws that call for the filling of federal positions. His lack of control
over the Senate would presumably preclude a finding that he had breached his duty
whenever Senate conduct was to blame for vacancies that interfered with the
faithful execution of the laws. But such Senate conduct would, nevertheless,
frustrate the constitutional policy of assuring that the laws be faithfully executed if
the Senate itself were not also bound by the same duty insofar as it is charged with
performing an essential function in the appointment process.
As with encroachment arguments, the contention that a Senate moratorium
impermissibly impairs the ability of the President and the Supreme Court to
perform their constitutional functions provides significant support for the
proposition that a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations is a prima
facie violation of the separation of powers. As with the encroachment theories,

410 U.S. CONST.

art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
Cf Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1241 (2015) (Thomas,
J.,
concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926)) ("[T]he President ... may carry
out his duty to take care that the laws be faithfilly executed with the aid of subordinates."). The Senate,
of course, is not the President's subordinate. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
411

§ 3.
413 Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process:Law orPorics?,101 HARv. L. REv. 1202,
412 U.S. CONsT. art. II,

1205-08 (1988) (reassessing and retracting the view that the Senate has a duty to confirm).
414 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695-96 (1988).
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however, the key determination of its constitutionality may be whether it is saved
4 15
from invalidity by a historical tradition that legitimizes it.

IV.

TRADITION

There are quite viable arguments that a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court
nominations impermissibly encroaches on the President's nomination power or
unduly impairs the ability of the President or the Supreme Court to perform their
constitutional functions. If any one of those several theories is a correct application
of the respective principles in a given situation, then a particular Senate
moratorium would constitute a prima facie violation of the separation of powers. In
this area of law, however, the historical practice of the branches receives
considerable weight as a factor.1 6 In effect, past practice may either confirm the
application of the encroachment or impairment principle or undermine a
conclusion reached by applying either of them in the abstract. Historical practice
may provide a safe harbor for a practice, such as a Senate moratorium, that might
otherwise be deemed an unconstitutional encroachment or impairment.
A look at the history of unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations, however,
reveals no validating tradition of Senate moratoriums on nominations. Until the
McConnell moratorium in the face of the Scalia vacancy in 2016, there is, literally,
no past instance of a Senate imposing a moratorium on Supreme Court
nominations and responding to unwelcome presidential nominations with
calculated disengagement and determined inaction. Although there are cases of
postponements for political or electoral reasons, none extends back to a point more
than a few months before a presidential election. None of this history rises to the
level of a consistent tradition of at least two decades in duration, which could
justify the practice of imposing a Senate moratorium on Supreme4 17 Court
nominations for many months or years until a new President takes office. Nor is
this a situation where there simply was no opportunity for such a tradition to
develop.41 8 There was ample opportunity. The Senate simply has not behaved in
such a way until now, as a survey of previous unsuccessful nominations shows.
Since George Washington submitted the first Supreme Court nominations in
1789, the Senate has received 162 of them. 4 19 The vast majority were either
415 See infra Part IV.

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559-60 (2014) (collecting cases).
CE Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690 (1929) ("[A] practice of at least twenty years duration
'on the part of the executive department, acquiesced in by the legislative department, ... is entitled to
great regard in determining the true construction of a constitutional provision the phraseology of which
is in any respect of doubtful meaning.'" (quoting State exrel. Norwalk v. South Norwalk, 58 A. 759, 761
(Conn. 1904))).
418 CT Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 (1997) (noting the dearth of relevant historical instances
of anyone even trying to sue a sitting President for unofficial conduct occurring before he took office).
419 RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 10 (identifying 160 nominations through 2012). Since
2012, there have been two additional nominations: Merrick Garland, whose nomination received no
Senate action, and Neil Gorsuch, whom the Senate confirmed in 2017. Supreme Court Nominations:
416
417
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confirmed or rejected in confirmation votes, 420 and, thus, provide no indication of
any tradition of ignoring Supreme Court nominations. Of the remaining twentysix nominations, the President ultimately withdrew eleven for various reasons,4 2 1
and fifteen, including the Garland nomination, expired without a direct
confirmation vote. 4 2 2 Any tradition of ignoring Supreme Court nominations would
have to appear somewhere among these twenty-six instances. 4 2 3
During the first half-century of the Senate's existence, disposing of a
presidential nomination required an affirmative act by the Senate. Its standing rules

Present-1789,

U.S.

SENATE,

https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm
[https://perma.cc/33Q87P8Y] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). Although the U.S. Senate website contains the most recent data on
Supreme Court nominations, in the subsequent discussion of historical Supreme Court nominations,
the author will rely primarily on the 2012 RUTKUS & BEARDEN legislative report as it contains more
descriptive and specific categorizations of Supreme Court nominees than the Senate website.
420 RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 10. Based on current numbers, out of the 162
nominations, 125 have been confirmed and eleven have been rejected by the Senate, for a total of 136
nominees, or approximately eighty-four percent. See id.
421 Id. at 10 &n. 35.
422 SeCid. at 10-11, 11 n.36.
423 In chronological order, these twenty-six nominations were:
(1) Washington's nomination of William Paterson in 1793 (withdrawn),
(2) J.Q Adams's nomination ofJohn J. Crittenden in 1829,
(3) Jackson's nomination of Roger B. Taney in 1835,
(4) Tyler's first nomination of Reuben H. Walworth in 1844 (withdrawn),
(5) Tyler's first nomination of Edward King in 1844,
(6) Tyler's second nomination ofJohn C. Spencer in 1844 (withdrawn),
(7) Tyler's second nomination of Reuben H. Walworth in 1844,
(8) Tyler's third nomination of Reuben H. Walworth in 1844 (withdrawn),
(9) Tyler's second nomination of Edward King in 1844 (withdrawn),
(10) Tyler's nomination ofJohn M. Read in 1845,
(11) Fillmore's nomination of Edward A. Bradford in 1852,
(12) Fillmore's nomination of George E. Badger in 1853,
(13) Fillmore's nomination of William C. Micou in 1853,
(14) Buchanan's nomination ofJeremiah S. Black in 1861,
(15) A. Johnson's nomination of Henry Stanbery in 1866,
(16) Grant's nomination of George H. Williams in 1874 (withdrawn),
(17) Grant's nomination of Caleb Cushing in 1874 (withdrawn),
(18) Hayes's nomination of Stanley Matthews in 1881,
(19) Cleveland's nomination of William B. Homblower in 1893,
(20) Harding's nomination of Pierce Butler in 1922,
(21) Eisenhower's nomination ofJohn M. Harlan, II in 1954,
(22) L. Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas in 1968 (withdrawn),
(23) L. Johnson's nomination of Homer Thornberry in 1968 (withdrawn),
(24) G.W. Bush's nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. in 2005 (withdrawn),
(25) G.W. Bush's nomination of Harrier E. Miers in 2005 (withdrawn), and
(26) Obama's nomination of Merrick B. Garland in 2016.
Id. at 10-11 nn.35-36; Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President Announcing Judge
Merrick
Garland
as
his
Nominee
to the
Supreme
Court (Mar.
16, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/16/remarks-president-announcingjudge-merrick-garland-his-nominee-supreme [https://perma.cc/EY44-KM7K]; see also About the
Court:Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 17; Timeline Guide to the US. Presidents, supranote 197.
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made no provision for the expiration of presidential nominations.4 In the four
instances during this period when the Senate objected to a Supreme Court
nominee, it necessarily terminated each nomination by an affirmative act. 425 In two
of those instances it rejected the nominee, and in the other two it effectively
rejected the nominee by voting to postpone consideration of the nomination
indefinitely.426 In each of these instances, the Senate made the decision by a
recorded vote on the Senate floor.427 In no instance during this first half-century
did the Senate ever simply ignore a Supreme Court nomination.428 Unless the
President himself withdrew a nomination, the Senate voted to confirm, reject, or
postpone each Supreme Court nomination made by a President during this

period.429 It was not until the difficult presidency of John Tyler that the Senate
amended its standing rules to provide for the automatic expiration of presidential
43 0
nominations at the end of each session of the Senate.
In the span of history since 1789, the Senate has disposed of unwelcome
Supreme Court nominations in several ways other than a direct up or down vote to
reject.43' Some of the instances can be dismissed as involving idiosyncratic trifles. In
the other instances, Presidents have withdrawn nominations for political reasons
unrelated to any Senate moratorium. In others, the Senate has effectively rejected
nominations by a procedural vote that was essentially a proxy for a confirmation
vote or has at least given nominations a meaningful committee vetting. In a few
instances, the Senate took no action on a nomination and allowed it to expire, but
the facts of those instances do not support the recognition of a sustained tradition
of imposing a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations.

424 See infra note 430; see also Clark, supra note 33, at 756 n.93. In one extraordinary instance,
Andrew Jackson submitted a Supreme Court nomination to the Senate of the outgoing 24th Congress
on the last full day of his term as President and its existence as a Congress. Dan McLaughlin, The

Garland Precedent Should Not Stop Gorsuch, Nat'

Rev.

(Mar.

20, 2017,

4:20 PM),

https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nominee-rejections-politicshas-lot-do-it/ [https://perma.cc/EM3G-AHZ8]. The Senate of the incoming 25th Congress then
confirmed the nomination a few days later, and Martin Van Buren, the new President, appointed the
confirmed nominee to the Supreme Court. Id.; see also RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 21-22.
425 See RuTKUS &BEARDEN, supranote 248, at 18-22.
426
427

d
d

42 See id. (showing the breakdown of rejection or postponement votes).
429 seeld
43

6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 171-72 (Washington, Govt Printing Office, 1887) (Feb. 18, 1843) ("[N]ominations made
by the President to the Senate, and which are neither approved nor rejected during the session at which
they are made, shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made by the
President, and that such shall hereafter be the rule of the Senate.").
41 See RUTKUS & BEARDEN, suprd note 248, at 18-40.
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A. IrrelevantInstances
Three of the withdrawalS4 32 can be easily dismissed as irrelevant. In 1793,
George Washington withdrew his first nomination of William Paterson upon
realizing that a few days remained before his Senate term expired.43 3 Although
Paterson had resigned from the Senate two years earlier to become governor of
New Jersey,"3 4 the Constitution bars a senator from appointment to any federal
office that was created "during the Time for which he was elected[.]""3 ' Once the
Senate term expired, Washington renominated him, and he was confirmed."36
Similarly, irrelevant was Lyndon Johnson's withdrawal of the nomination of
Homer Thornberry in 1968." ' Because he had been nominated for a vacancy that
would exist only if Justice Fortas were elevated to Chief Justice, the withdrawal of
the Fortas nomination eliminated the potential vacancy for which Thornberry was
nominated. 438 The last of these instances was George W. Bush's 2006 withdrawal
of his nomination of John Roberts to replace Justice O'Connor.4 3 ' Bush withdrew
the nomination when Chief Justice Rehnquist died and renominated Roberts to
replace Rehnquist instead of O'Connor.'o In none of these three instances did the
withdrawal reflect some sort of capitulation to Senate stonewalling as to that
nomination.
B. Rejection Res Judicata
Two last-ditch renominations by John Tyler may also be set aside as
irrelevant.441 On June 17, 1844, the final day of the Senate's session, Tyler
renominated two candidates whom the Senate had already rejected. In a flurry of
activity, he renominated John Spencer, withdrew that nomination, and then
renominated Reuben Walworth.' 2 The Senate barely had time to act on either
renomination. Tyler withdrew the Spencer renomination before the Senate could
even act on it, and when it received the Walworth renomination just before
adjournment, it refused to take it up." 3 The Senate had rejected a previous
432 These nominations are numbers (1), (23), and (24) on the chronological list. See supranote 423.

433 DENIS STEVENS RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL31989, SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMITrEE, AND SENATE 4

n.16 (2009).
434
About

Us

1ho

Was

Willarn

Patterson,

https://www.wpunj.edu/university/history/WilliamPatersonBio.html

WILLIAM
PATTERSON
U.,
[https://perma.cc/4QML-

AD4M] (last visited Feb. 24,2018).
435 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
436 RUTKUS, supra note 433, at 4 n.16.

437 Id. at 47.
438 RuTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 10 n.31.
439 RUTKUS, supra note 433, at 5 n.16.
44

Id.

"' These nominations are numbers (6) and (7) on the chronological list. See supta note 423.
"2 RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 22-23 (evidencing the tabling of Reuben Walworth
and the rejection ofJohn Spencer and their subsequent renominations).
443 Id. at 23.

207-20=8

Senators Can't Be Choosers

395

nomination of Spencer several months earlier and had effectively killed a previous
nomination of Walworth a mere two days earlier in a procedural vote.' 4 The
Senate entertained a motion to proceed on Walworth's last-minute renomination
5
but, hearing an objection, adjourned without re-voting on him." At most, this
incident stands for the proposition that the Senate need not indulge a last-ditch,
adjournment-day attempt by the President to have it reconsider a floor vote in
which it had already effectively rejected the very same nomination two days earlier
in the same session. There is no need to regard the Senate's refusal to act in this
instance as anything more than a kind of confirmation resjudicata.
C Substantive Withdrawals
Three of the withdrawals" 6 can also be dismissed as attributable to the usual
reason that Presidents withdraw nominations: recognition that the nominee has
7
become so politically controversial that successful confirmation is doubtful."
Consistent with this pattern were Ulysses Grant's 1874 withdrawal of two
nominations-those of George Williams and Caleb Cushing." Similar too was
George W. Bush's 2006 withdrawal of Harriet Miers' nomination to replace Justice
O'Connor.' None of these withdrawals involved the Senate outright ignoring the
45 0
nominations. The Grant nominees were reported favorably out of committee. In
the case of Miers, active committee deliberations were underway when the
nomination was withdrawn. 451 The timing of these nominations and withdrawals is
also inconsistent with a notion that the Senate was ignoring them in an effort to
hold a vacancy open for the next President. Grant and Bush were both still in the
52
first year of their second terms as President at the time,4 and the Senate
4 53
subsequently confirmed Supreme Court nominations made by both of them.

Id. at 22-23.
445 Id. at 23.
44

' These nominations are numbers (16), (17), and (25) on the chronological list. See supra note
423.
44
See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31171, SUPREME COURT
NOMINATIONS NOT CONFIRMED, 1789-AUGUST 2010, at 6 (2010) (listing the common reasons for

unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations).
4 ABRAHAM, supranote 307, at 104.
"4 HOGUE, supranote 447, at 12-13.
450 RUTKUS &8BEARDEN,supra note 248, at 26.
451 See id. at 39; Tom Curry, Document Dispute Snags Aers Nomination, NBC,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9773241/ns/us-news-the-changingcourt/t/document-dispute-snags7 6 2
miers-nomination/#.WghlexNSzUo%20(last%2Oupdated%200ct.%2024,%202005,%20 :4 % 0PM)
[https://perma.cc/RYD2-RJ9D] (last updated Oct. 24, 2005, 7:46 PM).
452 See Timnc6ne Guide to the US. Presidents,supra note 197.
453 See Supreme CourtNominations:Present-1789,supra note 419.
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D. ProceduralRejections
Ten of the twenty-six nominations can be classified as effective rejections of
the particular nominee on the merits.4 54 Some were later withdrawn while others
languished until expiring at the end of the session, but they all reached the floor of
the Senate, where further progress toward confirmation ended in a failed
procedural vote that signaled the Senate's unwillingness to confirm the nominee.
Eight of these nominations were either "postponed" or "tabled," usually with a
recorded vote at some point: John Quincy Adams's nomination of John J.
Crittenden in 1829,45s Andrew Jackson's nomination of Roger B. Taney as
Associate Justice in 1835,456 John Tyler's first4 57 and third"' nominations of
Reuben H. Walworth and his firsts9 and second460 nominations of Edward King in
1844, and Millard Fillmore's nominations of Edward A. Bradford in 1852' and of
George E. Badger in 1853. 2 To similar effect were procedural floor votes in two
other instances. In a recorded vote, the Senate refused to proceed to consider James
Buchanan's nomination of Jeremiah S. Black in 1861,13 and also in a recorded
vote, the Senate rejected a cloture motion seeking to cut off the filibuster of
Lyndon Johnson's 1968 nomination of Abe Fortas to be ChiefJustice.46 4 In none of

454 These nominations are numbers (2) through (5), (8), (9), (11), (12), (14), and (22) on the
chronological list. See supra note 464.
4553 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OFTHE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 644 (Washington, Duff Green 1828); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 21.
4564 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 484 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Mar. 3, 1835); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra

note 248, at 22.
457 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 344-45 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (June 15, 1844) (tabling the nomination
of Reuben Walworth in a 27-20 vote); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 23.
458 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 387 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Jan. 21, 1845) (tabling Walworth's

nomination by a voice vote); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 23.
459 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 345 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (June 15, 1844) (tabling Edward King's
nomination in a 29-18 vote); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 23.
46 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 387 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Jan. 21, 1845) (tabling King's second
nomination in a voice vote); RUTKuS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 23.
461 8 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 452 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Aug. 31, 1852) (tabling Bradford's
nomination in a voice vote); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 24.
4629 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 27-28 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 11, 1853) (postponing consideration
of Badger's nomination in a vote of 26-25); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supranote 248, at 24.
4

11 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA 278 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 21, 1861) (refusing to proceed in a
vote of 25-26); RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 25.
464 114 CONG. REC. 28,933 (1968); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 35; see Fred P.

Graham, Senate BarsMove to EndFibusterby FortasCritics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1968, at 1.
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these instances did the Senate merely treat the nomination as if it did not exist. All
received some form of disapproving floor action in the Senate.

E. Committee Action
At least four of the twenty-six nominations received at least committee action
instead of being outright ignored."s While not as weighty as floor action,
committee vetting of a nomination is inconsistent with the idea of a Senate
moratorium on taking any action on any Supreme Court nomination made by an
incumbent President.
i. Matthews
The first of these nominations met a fate similar to those rejected in a
procedural vote, albeit in committee rather than on the Senate floor. In 1881, the
Judiciary Committee considered and then voted to postpone Rutherford Hayes'
nomination of Stanley Matthews," who was renominated a month later by James
Garfield and confirmed." The committee postponement was driven by substantive
objections. Because of the nominee's past association with "financial and railroad
interests," Senators "exploded in anger" at his nomination, and the Judiciary
Committee "flatly refus[ed] to report the nomination out for floor action."** A
committee vote against a nomination because of objections to the nominee on the
merits constitutes Senate action on a nomination, not total disregard of a
nomination without regard to its merits. Whether the separation of powers might
require the Judiciary Committee to report an objectionable Supreme Court
nomination to the Senate floor without a recommendation instead of disposing of
it in committee may be an interesting question,"' but it is a significantly different
question from whether the Senate and its Judiciary Committee may
constitutionally decline even to consider the merits of a Supreme Court nomination
and ignore it as though it were never made. Matthews also was nominated during

465 These nominations are numbers (10) and (18) through (20) on the chronological list. See supra
note 423.
466 RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 27.
467

See id

ABRAHAM, supra note 307, at 109.
9 Cf Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (considering whether the Senate may
constitutionally delegate impeachment trials to a committee); see RUTKtJS &BEARDEN, supranote 248,
at 21, 25, 28-29, 32, 38 (noting that the nominations ofJohn J. Crittenden, Ebenezer R. Hoar, Lucius
QC. Lamar, William B. Homblower, John J. Parker, and Robert Bork were reported out of committee
unfavorably and that the nominations of Melville W. Fuller, George Shiras, Wheeler Peckham, and
Clarence Thomas were reported out of committee without a recommendation). In fact, when Stanley
Matthews was renominated by James Garfield, his nomination was reported out of the Judiciary
Committee unfavorably, but he was confirmed by the full Senate. RuTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note
248, at 27.
46
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the lame duck period and, in fact, just a few weeks before the end of the existing
presidency and Congress.470
ii. Read

Another nomination that expired without confirmation despite receiving
Senate action was John Tyler's nomination of prominent Philadelphia lawyer John
M. Read on February 8, 1845.471 The nomination was referred to the Judiciary
Committee the day it was received 472 and was reported out of committee less than a
week later. 473 Nevertheless, the Senate adjourned without acting on it.4 74
The reason seems to have been a simple lack of time, not any suspension of
Supreme Court confirmations until a new President took office. Although it is true
that Tyler's presidential term was ending and that he was being succeeded by
Democrat James K. Polk, 4 75 Read was also a Democrat at the time.4 7 6 On the very
day that his nomination was reported out of committee, the Senate voted to
confirm Justice Samuel Nelson, another late-term Democratic nomination by
Tyler.477 It was far from inconceivable that Read might still be confirmed. The rush
of business at the end of the Senate session, however, seems to have doomed the
nomination. After it was reported out of committee, the Senate only had two
additional executive sessions7 . before the constitutionally mandated end of the
session on March 4, 1845.479 At the end of the second of these executive sessions,
Democrat James Buchanan even moved to have the Senate take up the nomination
of his fellow Pennsylvanian, 480 but the Senate opted, to recess at 3 p.m. to take a
470 RUTKUS &BEARDEN,

supranote 248, at 10 n. 32, 27.

471 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OFTHE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 392 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (1845); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note
248, at 23.
472 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 392 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 8, 1845).
473 Id. at 396 (Feb. 14, 1845); see also RUTKuS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 23.
474 RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supranote 248, at 23.
41s See Timelne Guide to the US. Presidents, supranote 197.
476 1 AK. MCCLURE, OLD TIME NOTES OF PENNSYLVANIA 343-44 (Library ed., John C.
Winston Co. 1905). Although Read was a Democrat at the time of his nomination, he later became a
member of the Republican party. See id. at 265, 285, 344 (noting that in 1856 Read announced his
support for Republican presidential candidate, John C. Fremont).
417 RuTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 23; see also 1 OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. ET AL.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at app. C, C-1 (6th ed. Cengage Learning 2015) (2008)
(showing Supreme Court Justices and their political parties).
478 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 396-97 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 17, 1845); id at 397-410 (Feb. 26,
1845).
4
SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XII, amended byU.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; NCC Staff, March 4:
A Forgotten Huge Day in American History, NAT'L CONST. CTR. (Mar.
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/march-4-a-forgotten-huge-day-in-american-politics

4,

2013),

[https:/perma.cc/25UC-E64P].
480 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 410 (Washington, Govt Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 26, 1845).
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break before the start of an evening legislative session that lasted from 5 p.m. to 10
p.m. 481 There seems never to have been time for the Senate to return to that or any
other pending nomination. The Senate's sessions ran into the evening on each
remaining day of the session,48 2 culminating in a final adjournment at 2:30 a.m. on
March 4.483 Had Tyler nominated Read earlier in the lame-duck session, the
nomination might have been confirmed. In any event, it was even reported out of
committee and made the subject of a motion to proceed on the Senate floor. It was
not ignored.
iii. Butler
A third example of these nominations was Warren Harding's first nomination
of Pierce Butler on November 22, 1922.484 The nomination was referred to the
Judiciary Committee 485 and reported favorably on November 28.486 There was no
further action. 487 After that day of reporting, there was one more executive session
for confirmations,4" but Butler, a Minnesotan, was not confirmed then.489 The
New York Times reported, "In the executive session both of the Minnesota.
Senators, Nelson and Kellogg, pleaded for confirmation. All of the spoken.
opposition is understood to come from the Republican side."490 But the Judiciary
Committee had received letters and memorials sharply critical of Butler for his
background as a corporate lawyer representing railroads. 491 In light of the
481 CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 351, 353 (Feb. 26, 1845); see also 6 JOURNAL OF THE
EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 410
(Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 26, 1845).
482 The evening session on February 27 lasted from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong.,
2d Sess. 359, 363 (1845). On February 28, the Senate did not take an afternoon recess but worked
straight through until 7 p.m. Id. at 365-69. On March 1, the Senate adjourned at midnight, after an 11hour session. Id. at 375-83. After recessing for Sunday, March 2, the Senate's evening session on March
3-the final full day of the 28th Congress-lasted from 5:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. on the morning of
March 4. Id at 390-93.
483 Id. at 393.
484 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 29 (1922); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supr note 248, at
31.
485 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 29 (1922).
486 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 63 (1922); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at

31.

487 RrusTKU &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 31.

488 S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 64-101 (Dec. 4, 1922); 63 CONG. REC. 450-72 (Dec.
4, 1922).
489 S. ExEC.JOURNAL, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 333 (Dec. 4,1922) (listing unconfirmed nominations).
490 Senate Sends Back Buler Nomination: Fails to Confim Presidents Choice for Justice of the

Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1922, at 1.
491 Attack Pierce Butler as Railroad Lawyer: Sociadists of Ainneapolis Council Force Through
Resolution AssailngAppointee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1922, at 10; ObjectionsDelayAction on Butler:
Senate Judiciary Committee Gets Complaints About Nominee to the Supreme Bench, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1922, at 20 (illustrating the complaints the Judiciary Committee received); Senate Sends Back
Butler Nomination: Fails to Confirm President's Choice for Justice of the Supreme Court, supra note
490, at 1.
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substantive complaints, the Committee opted to postpone consideration of the
nomination.49 The problem was that that the President had tried to get Butler's
nomination confirmed during a two-week extra session of the Senate that Harding
had convened for completely unrelated reasons.493 The Committee delay doomed
the effort to confirm Butler during this brief session, but he was overwhelmingly
confirmed a few weeks later in the next session.4 9 4
iv. Hornblower
Grover Cleveland's nomination of New York corporate lawyer William B.
Hornblower on September 19, 1893,"9s also fit the pattern. The nomination was
referred to the Judiciary Committee, where it was considered without a hearing on
September 25 and October 25 and 30.496 It was not reported out of committee. 497
The obstacle was not a Senate moratorium on Supreme Court nominations, but a
feud with powerfl New York Senator, David B. Hill, over Cleveland's choice to
nominate a conservative corporate lawyer and personal loyalist.498 Hill used
senatorial courtesy to have the Senate ultimately reject the nominee following a
subsequent renomination.499 Cleveland renominated Hornblower on December
6.o Again, the nomination was referred to the Judiciary Committee, where it was
considered again without a hearing on December 11, 14, and 18.501 It was reported
out of committee unfavorably on January 8, 1894, and then actually rejected a week
later.502

492 Objections Delay Action on Butler: Senate Judiciay Committee Gets Complaints
About
Nominee to the Supreme Bench, supra note 491, at 20.
493 63 CONG. REC. 3 (Nov. 20, 1922). The reason for the extra session was to enact legislation to
privatize and subsidize the government-owned fleet of shipping vessels left over from a World War I
build up. Id. at 9-11 (Nov. 21, 1922);JOHN D. HICKS, REPUBLICAN ASCENDANCY: 1921-1933, at 910, 60-62, 89 (1960). The President's party had also lost seats in the 1922 election, so an extra session
of the "lame duck" 67th Congress would give his party extra time to legislate before the influence of
such progressive Republicans as Senator Robert La Follette would grow in the next one. HICKS, supra,
at 88-89.
494 RuTKuS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 32.
49S Id at 28; Albert M. Rosenblatt, Wilnam Butler Homblower, Hist. Soc'y N.Y. Cts.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/history-legal-bench-courtappeals.html?http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-courtappeals/homblower-william.html [https://perma.cc/S2VP-2WJB]-(last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
496 RUTKuS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 28.
497
498

d
Calvin R_ Massey, Comment, Getting There: A BriefHistoryof the PoliticsofSupreme Court

Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 1, 4 (1991).
4 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 134 (1974).
So RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 29.
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d

2017-2018

Senators Can't Be Choosers

401

E No Action
Including the Garland nomination, only four of the twenty-six nominations
arguably received no meaningful Senate action.so3 But, aside from the Garland
nomination, each is explained by reasons other than a flat Senate moratorium on
Supreme Court nominations.
i. Micou
The first Supreme Court nomination to receive no meaningful Senate
action was Millard Fillmore's nomination of prominent Louisiana attorney
William C. Micou on February 24, 1853.504 The Democratic-controlled Senate
had already procedurally rejected two of Fillmore's previous Whig nominations
to fill the vacancy, and was obviously disposed to save the vacancy for the
incoming Democratic President, Franklin Pierce, to fill.sos Reporting on the
nomination of Micou, the New York Times said, "There is a decisive majority
50
the
against his confirmation."so6 All in the same half-hour executive session
509
50 8
and
referred it to the Judiciary Committee,
Senate received the nomination,
then discharged it from the Committee.iO The discharge motion came from Pierre
Soule,s 1' a Democratic Senator from Louisiana, 512 perhaps as a gesture of respect
for a prominent fellow Louisianan whose nomination was doomed. There was no
recorded opposition to the motion,5 1 3 so it apparently did not represent a credible

503 These nominations are numbers (13), (15), (21), and (26) on the chronological list. See supra
note 423.
504 9 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 34 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 24, 1853); see RUTKUS & BEARDEN,
supra note 248, at 24.
s0s ABRAHAM, supra note 499, at 102-03.
so6 Latest Intelgence by Telegraph to the New-York Daily Times: From Washington-Scene
Between Hon. Geo. Brigs and the Postmaster-General-Nominationof AMcou-Mail Contract-

The Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1853, at 4.
507 See Latest Intelfence by Telegraph to the New-York Daily Times: XXXZud Congress...
Second Session, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1853, at 1 ("The Senate then went into Executive Session for
half an hour. Adjourned.") (summarizing Senate proceedings on February 24, 1853).
sos 9 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 34 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 24, 1853).
so' Id. at 35.
s1o Id. at 36.
s11 Id.
512
Soul,

Pierre,
BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
U.S.
CONGRESS,
[https://perma.cc/X6L4-W8DM]
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=s000682
(last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
.s 9 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 36 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (Feb. 24, 1853); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra
note 248, at 24.
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threat to those opposed to confirming Micou. Indeed, the Senate took no further
action on the nomination and allowed it to expire at the end of the session.514
Merely getting discharged from the Judiciary Committee was still more action
than the Garland nomination received from the Senate in 2016,515 but there is
another factor that renders the Micou nomination insignificant as a precedent.
February 24, 1853, the day the Senate received Micou's nomination, was one week
before the end of Fillmore's term as President, before the constitutionally
mandated adjournment of the 32nd Congress, before the inauguration of
President-elect Pierce, and before the convening of the next Congress.s"6 If the
Micou nomination stands as a precedent for the prerogative of the Senate to refuse
to act on a Supreme Court nomination, it is a precedent as to nomination received
only seven or fewer days before the end of the President's term. The Garland
nomination, in contrast, was received 310 days before the end of the President's
term-more than forty-four weeks, not one.51 7
ii. Stanbery

The second Supreme Court nomination to receive no Senate action was
Andrew Johnson's nomination of Henry Stanbery on April 16, 1866..5 But it is
actually incorrect to describe the Senate as having taken no action on the Stanbery
nomination. True, it did not take any action directly on the nomination, but it
certainly took action to dispense with the nomination. 519 The Senate actually took
two highly significant actions. First, it passed a bill, which became law with the
House's agreement, to abolish the Supreme Court seat for which Stanbery had
been nominated.5 2 0 That action would seem to qualify as a kind of super-rejection
of the nomination, and it also happened to have received the assent of Johnson,
who signed the bill into law.5 21 Second, Johnson effectively withdrew Stanbery's
nomination the day he received the vacancy-eliminating bill by sending the Senate
a new nomination of Stanbery to be Attorney General. 522 The Senate then
See RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 24.
See Richard Cowan, Senate Judiciary Committee Chainnan Grassley Tells Garland No
Hearings, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2016, 10:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtgarland/senate-judiciary-committee-chairman-grassley-tells-garland-no-hearings-idUSKCNOX9100
[https://perma.cc/57QD-84ZF].
s16 ABRAHAM, supranote 499, at 102-03; see also supra notes 259,478.
117 The Garland nomination was received March 16, 2016, which was 310 days prior to January 20,
2017, the end of President Obama's term. See Supreme Court Timcne: From Scalia' Death to
Garland
to
Gorsuch,
USA
Today
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/31/timeline-of-events-after-the-death-ofjustice-antonin-scalia/97299392/ [https:/perma.cc/TE9R-26QR].
sI RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 25.
s19 See infra notes 520-523 and accompanying text.
520 HOGUE, supra note 447, at 5 &nn.
11-13.
521 SeeJudicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209.
514

515

522 14, pt. 2 JOURNAL OF THE EXEcUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 994 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1887) (July 20, 1866).
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confirmed that new nomination three days later when Johnson signed the bill
5 23
abolishing the Supreme Court seat.

iii. Harlan
The third Supreme Court nomination to receive no meaningful Senate action
was Dwight Eisenhower's first nomination of Justice John M. Harlan, II on
November 9, 1954.524 The nomination was referred to the Judiciary Committee,
which took no action on it and allowed it to expire at the end of the Senate
session.52 5 Although the bare facts may seem similar to the Senate's response to the
Garland nomination, the resemblance is superficial. There are significant
differences that confound a comparison.
Perhaps most significant is the timing. Eisenhower submitted the Harlan
nomination during the lame duck period following the 1954 elections, which had
taken place on November 2,526 and the late nomination was pending before the
Senate for only twenty-one days until the Senate adjourned.5 27 To the extent that it
could serve as a precedent for Senate disregard of a Supreme Court nomination, it
is a precedent covering only the last three weeks of a Senate session or, at the
absolute most, fifty-five days before the constitutionally mandated dissolution of
the existing Congress. 528
But this first Harlan nomination does not provide a dear precedent for even
that period of time. The failure to act on the nomination is attributable to a
number of unique factors that have nothing to do with a decision to preclude a
sitting President from appointing a Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, postponing the
Harlan nomination until the end of this, the 83rd Congress would do nothing to
keep Eisenhower from making a Supreme Court nomination when the 84th
Congress convened on January 5, 1955.529 His first term as President would not
end for another two years, and there was obviously reason to imagine that he might
even serve for an additional four-year term."o The failure to act on his first Harlan
nomination decidedly was not motivated by a desire to hold the vacancy for two
or six years for whomever the subsequent President might be. Indeed, the
523

Id. at 1043 (July 23, 1866); seeJudicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209.

524

100 CONG. REC. 15,911 (1954).

525 RUTKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248,
526

at 34.

OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., at III (Gov't Printing Office

1956).

527 See 100 CONG. REc. 15,911, 16,404 (1954); RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 7, 10

n.32.
528 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
529 See 101 CONG. REC. 3 (1955) (marking the start of the 84th Congress); see also Years ofthe lst

SENATE,
U.S.
(1789-2018),
Congresses
115th
Through
https://www.senate.gov/reference/Years toCongress.htm [https://perma.cc/3BVN-XX49] (last visited
Feb. 25,2018).
s30 See Difg-ht D. Eisenhower, WHITEHOUSE.GOv, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-thewhite-house/presidents/dwight-d-eisenhower/ [https://perma.cc/QB64-C2Z4] (last visited Feb. 25,
2018).
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Democratic-controlled Senate531 overwhelmingly confirmed Harlan just ten weeks
into the 84th Congress when Eisenhower resubmitted the nomination.532
The reasons for the failure to act on the first nomination of Harlan were
altogether different from some effort to hold the vacancy for the next President.
The first nomination was submitted during an unusual extra session of the Senate.
The House of Representatives had already adjourned for the remainder of the 83rd
Congress on August 20, 1954.133 The Senate had recessed then as well, but
pursuant to a special resolution providing for their reconvening later in the year for
an extra, final session without the House.5 34 The reason for that unusual session
was to conduct the special business of debating and deciding whether to censure
Senator Joseph McCarthy for his Communist witch-hunts. 5 s The Senate returned
from its recess on November 8 to receive and begin debating committee reports on
McCarthy's behavior.s1 6 The Senate adopted special rules precluding workday
committee hearings during the three-week debate over McCarthy,s 37 and upon
voting to censure him, the Senate adjourned its final session of the 83rd Congress
on December 2.s3s It was during this unusual extra session that Eisenhower
submitted his first Harlan nomination and tried to get it confirmed.s3 ' Even White
House officials were at best only "hopefil"s' that confirmation would be possible
during this censure session, and one alternative was to try and secure confirmation
without a committee hearing on the theory that the Senate had recently confirmed
Harlan as a circuit judge.541 Within two days of the nomination, however, the
Republican Chair of the Judiciary Committee was saying "he saw no chance" of
confirmation during the censure session and cited the restrictions on hearings
imposed to prevent interference with the censure debate.54 2 The Majority and
Minority Leader had agreed that the Senate would not confirm nominations that
required a hearing.5 43 The Chair nevertheless tried to schedule a Harlan hearing for
November 19,s" but he finally gave up on the effort by the time that date arrived.5 45
The nomination would have to wait until Congress returned in January.
s31 PartyDivision, supra note 15.
532 See HOGUE, supra note 447, at 3, 9; RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 7 & n.20, 10
n.32, 34; see also RUTKUS, supranote 433, at 4.
s33 RICHARD S. BETH & JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33677, LAME
DUCK SESSIONS OF CONGRESS, 1935-2012 (74TH-112TH CONGRESSES) 9, 21 (2014),
https://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL33677.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TA4-Z6KT].
s34 See 100 CONG. REC. 15,836 (1954); BETH &TOLLESTRUP, supranote 533, at 4,9,21.
s3s 100 CONG. REC. 15,837 (1954); see also BETH &TOLLESTRUP, supra note 533, at 21.
536 BETH &TOLLESTRUP, supranote 533, at 9,21.

s37 See 100 CONG. REC. 16,050-51 (1954).
538 Id. at 16,392-95, 16,404.
s39 Id. at 15,911.
54 EisenhowerNames US Judge Harlan to Supreme Court:Repubcan Is Now on CircuitBench
Here-Nomination Goes to Senate Today, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1954, at 1.
541 Id; Senate Unit Backs Appointee to FC.C: However, the Democrats Raise Floor Bar to
McConnaughey-Delayon Harlan Hinted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1954, at 33.
542 Senate Unit Backs Appointee to FCC., supra note 541, at 33.
543 100 CONG. REC. 16,050-51 (1954).
44 Hearingon HarlanSet for Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1954, at 33.
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It would not be accurate to say that politics and obstruction had nothing to do
with the delay. The Democrats had won enough seats in the November election to
flip control of the chamber to them when the 84th Congress convened in
January.546 Still, they did confirm Harlan then, so it was not the case that the
postponement was about precluding Eisenhower from making an appointment or
even from appointing Harlan.547 To the extent that the postponement rested in part
on Democratic political motives, they seemed to center on placating a handful of
powerful segregationist Senators who remained apoplectic over the Supreme
Court's landmark desegregation decision in Brown v BoardofEducation from six
months earlier.5 48 Even the segregationists' motive seemed only to be about buying
a few months' time.5 49 The Supreme Court had scheduled oral arguments in the
implementation phase of Brown for December 6.0o Without a full complement of
Justices, the Court postponed the arguments indefinitely until the eventual filling
of the vacancy for which Harlan was nominated.ss' Forcing the Court to delay the
decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation Hwas the apparent goal of segregationist
Senators.552 As far as political motives are concerned, however, it was also true that
the conservative Robert A. Taft wing of the Republican Party was not thrilled with
the Harlan nomination either and vocalized their annoyance with Eisenhower's
choice of a moderate New York Republican for the Court." The result was
pressure for a hearing and more vetting of the nomination than the Judiciary
Committee could manage in the short window of opportunity and alongside the
time-consuming censure debate. 55 4
Even with the expiration of the first nomination of Harlan, the intersession
recess over the holidays, and the eventual confirmation after renomination, the

545 See William S. White, Harlan Approval Blocked Until '55, Senate ConsiderationPut Off at
Request ofEastland UntilNext Congress, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 20,1954, at 20.
546 PartyDivision, supra note 15.
s41 RUrKUS &BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 34.

-

548 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, in THE WARREN
COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 236, 237-38 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996); Herb Altschull, Brown s.
Board of Education: Here' What Happened in [sic] 1954 Courtroom, L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2014,
5 8
7:22 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-brown-v-board-ap-original-20140 1
story.html [https://perma.cc/VJM6-B5QK].
549 See William S. White, Democrats Make Aggressive Plans: Senate Policy Group Decides to
Delay Confirnations, Force Consultation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1954, at 1 (indicating that the
Democrats only intended to postpone confirmations until the McCarthy issue was resolved).
sso Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 348 U.S. 886 (1954) (order postponing oral arguments that
had been scheduled for December 6, 1954).
552 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Luther A. Huston, SchoolBias Case to
Await Harlan:Implementation Arguments Delayed by Supreme Court Till There Is FullBench, N.Y.
WALL:
A
PAY
[BEHIND
at
49.
1954,
23,
Nov.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/1954/11/23/archives/school-bias-case-to-await-harlan-implementationarguments-delayed.html]
Ss3 See White, supra note 549, at 1.
554 See 100 CONG. REc. 16,050 (1954); White, supra note 549, at 1.
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time from first nomination to confirmation was still only 127 days,5 55 significantly
fewer than half of the 310 days that the Garland nomination would languish in
55 6
deliberate disregard six decades later.

G. Garland
The Senate's treatment of the Garland nomination in 2016 was significantly
different. It represented a real, total moratorium on Supreme Court nominations,
including the deliberate refusal to take any but the most rote and de minimis
55
action.s
When the President submitted the Garland nomination on March 16,
2016,s5 the Senate did next to nothing to act in response. By force of a pre-existing
standing rule of the Senate 5 the nomination was referred as a matter of course to
the Judiciary Committee.5 6 0 Once there, the nomination was all but ignored as if it
did not exist.5 6 1 The Committee did not draft the usual biographical questionnaire
for a Supreme Court nominee or otherwise solicit information from the nominee to
assist in assessing his fitness to serve. 5 6 2 At the nominee's own initiative, he
submitted information on a form questionnaire designed for lower court
nominees,5 6 3 which the Committee at least posted online along with a financial
disclosure statement from the nominee.5 64 The Committee did not initiate the
usual FBI background check of the nominee in preparation for assessing his
566
56
The Committee did not schedule or hold any confirmation hearing,
fitnesss.
56 7
and only a handful of Republican Senators ever even met with the nominee. The

sss See RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 248, at 34.
556 See Amy Howe, GarandNomination Of6fcially Expires, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:47
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/garland-nomination-officially-expires/
PM),
[https://perma.cc/X7D5-SBDW]; supra note 517 and accompanying text.
ss. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 33, at 743-44; Huetteman, supra note 320.
55. 162 CONG. REC. S1551 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2016).
ss9 S. DOc. No. 113-18, at 43-44 (2013).
560 162 CONG. REc. S1540, S1551 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2016).
56 Supreme CourtNominations:Present-1789,supranote 419.
562 Huetteman, supranote 320; Sherman & Jalonick, supra note 319.
563 Huetteman, supranote 320.
564
PN1258-114:
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Comm.
JUDICIARY,
[https://perma.cc/T24U-6T3L]
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/executive/pnl258-114
(last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
565 Transcript: Legal View with Ashleigh Banfield: Obama Taps Merrick Garlandto Succeed Scala
16,
2016),
broadcast
Mar.
(CNN
television
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/16/lvab.01.html [https://perma.cc/VM2R-H2M5].
566 Doug G. Ware, Nomination Expires for Obama Supreme CourtAppointee Merrick Garland,
UPI (Jan. 3, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.upi.com/TopNews/US/2017/01/03/Nomination-expires[https://perma.cc/M9GGfor-Obama-Supreme-Court-appointee-Merrick-Garland/4841483472115/
T2EB].
567
US. Senators on the Nomination of Menick Garland, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/U.S._Senators-onthenominationofMerrickGarland
[https://perma.cc/C8HA-A4Y8] (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
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56 8
nor
Committee did not vote on the nomination or report it out of committee,
9
was the nomination ever discharged from the committee.s" Obviously, there was
never any vote or other floor action on the nomination by the full Senate.s"o Again
7
by force of a preexisting Senate rule, the nomination expireds ' and was eventually
57 2
when the Senate's session ended by constitutional
returned to the President
mandate on January 3, 2017.s7' The Judiciary Committee's online posting of two
unsolicited documents supplied by the nominee at his own initiative appears to be
the only discretionary act performed by the Senate in response to its receipt of the

nomination. 574
The Garland nomination stands out as the unique example. While electoral
politics influenced a few of the previous unsuccessful nominations, the Senate
simply does not have any history of announcing a flat moratorium on any Supreme
Court nominations from the sitting President during the remainder of his term.
Past practice cannot save a Senate moratorium from invalidity if it otherwise fails to
satisfy a requirement of the separation of powers.
CONCLUSION

When Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell announced a total
moratorium on Supreme Court nominations for as long as Barack Obama
remained President,s7 s he opened a dangerous Pandora's box. The 419-day vacancy
it imposed upon the Court may have dearly broken the modem record of 391 days
set during the Nixon administration,s7 ' but perhaps the country could adjust even
to a Senate-imposed moratorium during every fourth year of a presidential term. In
assessing separation of powers challenges to novel exercises of power, however, the
Supreme Court has kept a wary eye on the prospect that approval of such an
arrangement, however benign or at least tolerable it may seem in its present form,
may easily "provide[] a blueprint for extensive expansion of the ... power beyond
its constitutionally confined role."s77 The McConnell moratorium itself has already
56s See Judiciary Committee Votes on Recent Supreme Court Nominees, S. COMM. JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/supreme-court/committee-votes
[https://perma.cc/L23B-9ECX] (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
69 PN1258 - Menick B. Gariand - Supreme Court of the United States, CONGRESS.Gov,
(last
[https://perma.cc/NN5C-2438]
https://www.congress.gov/nomination/114th-congress/1258
visited Feb. 25, 2018).
s70 Supreme CourtNominations:Present-1789, supranote 419.
571 S. Doc. NO. 113-18, at 44 (2013).
5 72
PN1258-114: MerrickB. Garland, supra note 564.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
57
4 PN1258-114:Menick B. Garland, supra note 564.
s7s Carroll, supra note 374.
576 Drew DeSilver, Long Supreme Court Vacancies Ued to be More Common, PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/26/long-supreme-court-vacanciesused-to-be-more-common/ [https://perma.cc/5CPJ-VXNP].
s77 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252,277 (1991).
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cast a major shadow across the legitimacy of 5-4 decisions whose outcome is
plausibly traced to the substitution of Justice Gorsuch for Judge Garland."' The
significance of that impairment of the Court's legitimacy may only become
apparent over time. But what may also become apparent over time is the
metastasizing of the McConnell moratorium into a routine practice of simply
refusing to entertain any Supreme Court nomination from a President of a
different party. Indeed, it only took months for interest groups to pressure Senate
candidates into endorsing exactly that idea.s" Tradition plays a major role in
defining the boundaries of the permissible dealings of the branches of government
with each other, and tradition emerges from the first crack of a door. That door has
now been opened to extended, politically motivated Senate moratoriums on
Supreme Court nominations. The encroachment and impairment that it entails
cast grave doubt on its constitutionality, and it currently finds no safe harbor in
historical practice. Whether the imposition of such a moratorium will continue to
present a grave constitutional question, however, depends on what tradition
develops now that the door has been opened. The potential evils of further
expansion are already audible just over the horizon. Calling out the probable
constitutional invalidity of the McConnell moratorium, dearly repudiating it, and
preventing a repetition and expansion are imperative if the practice is not to gain a
constitutional safe harbor in a newly established tradition.

s' See Stone, supra note 389; see also text accompanying notes 389-390.
s79 Eric Lipton, Supreme Court Nomination Drives Groups from Left and Right to Fight, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/activists-protestnomination-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/95SM-3GS7].

